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The Conflict Between Religious Exercise and
Efforts to Eradicate Housing Discrimination

Against Nontraditional Couples: Should
Free Exercise Protect Landlord Bias?
Scott A. Johnson

L Introduction
Traditional religious beliefs have increasingly come under fire in
today's society, in part due to the widening gulf that exists between the
morals and ideals of traditional religions and the views of modem secular
society. The rise of the religious right in the political arena has brought
about a rhetoric derogatory of all who place religion as the central pillar in
their lives. The message of this rhetoric, in the words of Professor Stephen
Carter, is that "believing deeply in the tenets of one's faith represents a kind
of mystical irrationality, something that thoughtful, public-spirited American
citizens would do better to avoid."' Yet despite this vocal distrust of
religion, many Americans hold freedom of religious belief dear.
At the same time, more and more Americans are realizing the
importance of the principles of equality and equal opportunity in today's
diverse world. The eradication of discrimination furthers the fundamental
goals of equal treatment and tolerance of a multitude of beliefs. Inevitably,
as a result of the widely diverse views that exist in today's society, religious
exercise and lifestyle preferences sometimes conflict.
A legal problem indicative of this societal conflict arises when
landlords, believing that the facilitation of cohabitation is sinful, refuse to
rent to unmarried couples. The landlord's action conflicts with the government's interest in eliminating housing discrimination. While consensus is
unlikely, society has increasingly accepted this living arrangement as the
number of couples choosing to live outside of the constraints of marriage
continues to grow.2 Recently, several courts have addressed this issue, and
1. STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF 6-7 (1993). Professor Carter

summarizes the problem that leads to this conflict of religion and contemporary society
by stating: "In contemporary American culture, the religions are more and more treated as
just passing beliefs - almost as fads, older, stuffier, less liberal versions of so-called New
Age - rather than as the fundaments upon which the devout build their lives." Id. at 14.
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the majority of these decisions support the right of landlords to refuse to rent
to unmarried couples based on religious exercise protections.
This Note examines the conflict between the free exercise rights of
landlords and the state's interest in eradicating housing discrimination,
particularly in the context of marital status discrimination. Part II briefly
discusses the development of the free exercise doctrine at both the federal and
state levels. 4 Part III examines the protection that local, state, and federal law
provides unmarried couples.5 Part IV reviews the steps of a free exercise
analysis within the framework of several recent decisions addressing landlord
discrimination against unmarried couples based on religious beliefs.6 Finally,
Part V raises some questions regarding the effect of recent holdings on other
landlord-tenant situations, specifically when a landlord refuses to rent to
homosexual or lesbian couples for religious reasons. 7
andSocial Analysis of Domestic PartnershipOrdinances, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1164, 1165 n.5
(1992) (noting that number of unmarried heterosexual couples living together jumped from
523,000 in 1970 to estimated 2,856,000 in 1990 (citing U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T
OF COMMERCE, SERIES P-20, No. 450, MARITAL STATUS AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS:
MARCH 1990, at 14 (1990)). The number jumped to 3,308,000 in 1992. U.S. BUREAU OF
THE CENSUS,

DEP'T OF COMMERCE,

CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS:

POPULATION

CHARACTERISTICS, SERIES P20-468, MARITAL STATUS AND LIVING ARRANGEMENTS: MARCH

1992, at XVI tbl. K (1992); see also Maureen E. Markey, The Price of Landlord's "Free"
Exercise of Religion: Tenant's Right to Discrimination-FreeHousing and Privacy, 22
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 699, 740-43 (1995) (discussing statistical evidence in growth of number
of unmarried couples since 1960s).
3. See generally Smith v. Commission of Fair Employment & Hous., 30 Cal. Rptr.
2d 395 (Ct. App.) (holding that state cannot force landlord to violate her religious beliefs in
order to advance its interest in eradicating housing discrimination against unmarried couples),
review granted, 880 P.2d 111 (Cal. 1994); Donahue v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n,
2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 32 (Ct. App. 1991) (same), review granted, 825 P.2d 766 (Cal. 1992), review
dismissed and cause remanded, 859 P.2d 671 (Cal. 1993); Attorney Gen. v. Desilets, 636
N.E.2d 233 (Mass. 1994) (refusing to hold that state's interest in preventing housing
discrimination against unmarried couples always prevails over religious beliefs). But see
Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274 (Alaska) (refusing to grant
exemption from housing discrimination laws based on religious beliefs), cert. denied, 115
S. Ct. 460 (1994).
4. See infra notes 8-28 and accompanying text (discussing development of free exercise doctrine).
5. See infra notes 29-72 and accompanying text (discussing protections offered unmarried couples).
6. See infra notes 73-169 and accompanying text (examining recent cases addressing
conflict between landlords' religious exercise and efforts to eradicate discrimination against
unmarried couples).
7. See infra notes 170-235 and accompanying text (discussing extension of analysis to
other contexts, primarily landlord discrimination against homosexual or lesbian couples).

SHOULD FREE EXERCISE PROTECTLANDLORD BIAS?
I. FreeExercise Jurisprudence
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits
Congress from making any laws that prohibit the free exercise of religion!
The Fourteenth Amendment extends this protection to state action. 9 Defining
this protection, the Supreme Court has recognized that the First Amendment
guarantees an absolute right in religious belief.'" Moreover, the First
Amendment ensures a conditional right in religiously motivated action, subject
to state restriction under certain circumstances."
The Supreme Court, in Sherbert v. Verner,2 expanded the protection
offered religious action.' 3 The Court promulgated a test which provided that
the government could not substantially burden religious exercise unless the
state demonstrated a compelling interest.' 4 However, in Employment Division
8.

U.S. CONST. amend. I (stating that "Congress shall make no law respecting an

establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof").
9. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (recognizing that Fourteenth Amendment prevents states from enacting laws prohibiting free exercise of religion);
see also RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN THE SUPREME COURT 15 (Terry Eastland ed., 1993) (discussing Cantwell as "open[ing] the door to. federal litigation over religion-clause claims
against the states").
10. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878) (finding that First
Amendment denied Congress any power over belief, but allowed Congress to regulate action
when that action was "in violation of social duties or subversive of good order"); see also
Edward E. Smith, Note, The Criminalization of Belief When Free Exercise Isn't, 42
HASTINGS L.J. 1491, 1495-96 (1991) (noting Court's recognition of distinction between

"belief" and "conduct").
11. See Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 303-04 (finding freedom of belief absolute, but freedom
of action limited). In Cantwell, the Court expanded the protection offered religion by
Reynolds. Id. at 304. The Court found that the First Amendment guaranteed the freedom
to act in some situations. Id.; see also GREGG IVERS, REDEFINING THE FIRST FREEDOM 13334 (1993) (recognizing that Supreme Court distinguishes religious beliefs and religiously
grounded acts and provides greater protection for former); Stephen Pepper, Conflicting
Paradigmsof Religious Freedom: Liberty Versus Equality, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REv. 7, 28
(discussing Cantwell's extension of protection beyond belief to include action, although to
"significantly lesser degree"); Smith, supra note 10, at 1496 (noting Cantwell's protection of
actions within certain limits).
12. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
13. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963) (adopting compelling state
interest-least restrictive alternative test in free exercise cases). In Sherbert, the Court
examined the denial of state unemployment benefits to a Seventh-Day Adventist who lost her
job upon her refusal to work on Saturday, her sabbath. Id. at 399-401. The Court found that
the denial of benefits was a burden on the appellant's free exercise. Id. at 403-04. Failing
to find a state interest compelling enough to justify the infringement on the appellant's rights,
the Court provided the appellant with a free exercise exemption. Id. at 406-09.
14. Id. at 403; see WTisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972) (applying compelling
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v. Smith,'5 the Court adopted a much more deferential test that allowed
substantial government encroachment on religious exercise.' 6 According to
Smith, the Court will not grant free exercise exemptions from a generally
applicable law, despite substantial burdens the law may impose on religious
exercise. 7 The Smith decision has received a steady hail of criticism. 8 In
state interest test when state convicted Amish parents of violating compulsory attendance
law). In Yoder, the Court reconsidered the conviction of Amish parents who violated a
state mandatory school attendance law as a result of their belief that attendance of high
school was contrary to the teachings of their religion. Id. at 207-09. The Court, while
recognizing the importance of the state's interest in universal education, found that when
the state's interest intrudes on fundamental rights, the conflict is subject to a balancing test.
Id. at 214. Thus, ai the state's interest in compulsory education was not sufficiently
compelling to overcome the burden placed on religious exercise, the court granted an
exemption. Id. at 234; see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
1256 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing importance of Sherbert's adoption of compelling state
interest-least restrictive alternative test); Angela C. Carmella, State Constitutional
Protectionof Religious Exercise:An Emerging Post-Smith Jurisprudence, 1993 B.Y.U. L.
REv. 275, 277 (discussing burden on state, under Sherbert, to justify restriction as
compelling interest that exemption would impair if allowed and to show that no less
restrictive measure is available); Smith, supra note 10, at 1497 (addressing burden on
state to demonstrate that no less restrictive measures would be sufficient). There is some
debate over whether Sherbert and Yoder actually expanded the protection of religious
exercise. See Markey, supra note 2, at 710-12 (discussing Court's articulation of Sherbert
test and its failure to find exemptions under test). Since Sherbert was decided in 1963, the
Supreme Court has allowed free exercise exemptions in only four cases. Frazee v. Illinois
Dep't of Employment See., 489 U.S. 829 (1989); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals
Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Yoder, 406
U.S. at 205.
15. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
16. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-82 (1990) (finding that free
exercise doctrine does not relieve individual from compliance with law if that law is generally applicable and otherwise constitutional, even though it incidentally burdens free
exercise of religion). In Smith, the court examined whether the state of Oregon could deny
unemployment benefits to two members of the Native American Church who were fired
from their positions with a drug rehabilitation center because they used peyote, a hallucinogenic drug, for religious reasons. Id. at 874. The court refused to apply the Sherberttest
and instead examined the state statute on the basis of its general applicability to all individuals. Id. at 882-90. The Court found that if generally applicable, a law need not be
supported by a compelling government interest in order to overcome a free exercise
challenge. Id. at 882-89. There are two exceptions to this rule, one for so-called "hybrid"
situations, in which the action in question involves constitutionally protected rights other
than religious exercise, and a second when the conflict requires an examination of unemployment compensation eligibility rules, such as was the case in Sherbert. Id. at 881-83.
17. Id. at 882-89.
18. See, e.g., IVERS, supra note 11, at 173 (concluding that results of Smith promise
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response to Smith, Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
(RFRA). 9 RFRA, which a wide range of religious and civil liberties
organizations supported, creates a statutory right to the free exercise of

religion.' By adopting RFRA, Congress attempted to restore the compelling
state interest test established by Sherbert2 1 and its progeny.' Under RFRA,
the government may substantially burden the free exercise of religion only
if this burden would further a compelling government interest and is the least

to be tragic and will force "majoritarian politics" to determine fate of religious minorities);
Richard F. Duncan, Who Wants to Stop the Church:Homosexual Rights Legislation, Public
Policy, and Religious Freedom, 69 NoTRE DAME L. RV. 393, 398, 419 (1994) (calling
Smith decision "unwise" and finding fault with its "textual interpretation," "historical
analysis," and "understanding of free exercise precedents"); Ira C. Lupu, Employment
Division v. Smith and the Decline of Supreme Court-Centrism,1993 B.Y.U. L. Rv.259,
260 (stating that Smith decision was "substantively wrong" and "institutionally irresponsible" because it ignored history and actual text of Free Exercise Clause, it "offend[ed]
institutional and process norms," it relied on discredited decisions, and it failed to allow
parties to brief and argue issues); Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and
the Smith Decision, 57 U. Cm. L. REy. 1109 (1990) (finding fault with Smith). But cf.
William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism, 58 U. CHI. L.
REV. 308, 308-09 (1991) (expressing disappointment with opinion, but agreeing with
central contention); Mark Tushnet, The Rhetoric of Free ExerciseDiscourse, 1993 B.Y.U.
L. REv. 117, 129-38 (examining benefits to religious exercise likely to result from Smith).
19. Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (Supp. V 1993)).
20. See Douglas Laycock, FreeExercise and the Religious FreedomRestorationAct,
62 FORDHAM L. REv. 883, 895 (1994) (stating that in enacting RFRA, Congress was
attempting to allow religious minorities to practice their religion, not just think about it, by
creating statutory right to free exercise of religion under congressional authority to enforce
rights incorporated into Fourteenth Amendment); Douglas Laycock, The Religious Freedom
RestorationAct, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REv. 221, 246 (stating that RFRA would not actually
overrule Supreme Court's decision in Smith, but would "create a statutory right where the
Court declined to create a constitutional right").
21. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) (applying compelling state interestleast restrictive alternative test).
22. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972) (requiring showing of
compelling state interest before state can burden religious exercise); see also 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000bb (Supp. V 1993) (discussing applicable test in free exercise analysis). RFRA
provides in part:
The purposes of this chapter are - (1) to restore the compelling interest test as set
forth in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205 (1972) and to guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise
of religion is substantially burdened; and (2) to provide a claim or defense to
persons whose religious exercise is substantially burdened by the government.
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restrictive means of furthering that interest.' RFRA applies to all federal
and state laws, regardless of their dates of enactment.24
Since Smith, several state courts have recognized a greater protective

standard for the free exercise of religion under state constitutions, either in
the language of the particular state provision or the court's interpretation of
provisions similar to the First Amendment. In State v. Hershberger,2 the
Supreme Court of Minnesota was the first state supreme court to reject the

analysis of Smith in the interpretation of state constitutional provisions
similar to those of the federal constitution and instead relied on a compelling27
state interest test similar to that applied at the federal level prior to Smith.

Several state courts subsequently chose to apply the pre-Smith federal free
exercise analysis.'
23. Id. § 2000bb-1(b).
24. Id. § 2000bb-3(a).
25. See Carmella, supra note 14, at 275 (recognizing that some state constitutions
provide greater protection of free exercise of religion than federal constitution provides); Neil
McCabe, The State and FederalReligion Clauses: Differences of Degree and Kind, 5 ST.
THOMAS L. REv. 49, 49-51 (1992) (recognizing that state courts have authority to interpret
their own constitutions in their own way and that protections provided may be greater than,
less than, or completely different from those protections that federal constitution provides);
G. Alan Tarr, Church and State in the States, 64 WASH. L. REv. 73, 79 (1989) (stating that
states can interpret their own constitutions in manner independent of federal precedent or
constitutional norms).
26. 462 N.W.2d 393 (Minn. 1990).
27. See State v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393, 399 (Minn. 1990) (finding state statute
requiring display of slow-moving vehicle emblem on Amish defendants' buggy violation of
defendant's freedom of conscience rights). In Hershberger, the Minnesota Supreme Court
considered whether a state statute requiring the attachment of a slow-moving vehicle emblem
onto the Amish defendants' buggy was a violation of the defendants' religious freedom. Id.
at 397. The U.S. Supreme Court earlier had remanded the case to be decided in light of
Employment Division v. Smith. Id. at 395. However, the Minnesota court declined to apply
the analysis of Smith because of what it called Smith's "uncertain meaning" and instead
applied state constitutional provisions. Id. at 396-97. These provisions, according to the
court, were "of a distinctly stronger character than the federal counterpart." Id. at 397. The
state provisions expanded the protections of the First Amendment to preclude infringements
on or interference with religious freedom. Id. The court, in its analysis, admittedly
borrowed the compelling state interest-least restrictive alternative test from established federal
constitutional doctrine. Id. at 398. The court, ruling for the defendants, found that the state
failed to demonstrate that both freedom of conscience and the compelling interest in public
safety could not be achieved through less restrictive measures. Id. at 399.
28. See Society of Jesus v. Boston Landmarks Comm'n, 564 N.E.2d 571, 574 (Mass.
1990) (striking down landmark designation of interior of church as restraint on worship);
First Covenant Church v. City of Seattle, 840 P.2d 174, 188-89 (Wash. 1992) (finding that
preservation ordinance violated free exercise under both First Amendment and state
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III. Efforts to EradicateHousing Discrimination
The level of protection that housing antidiscrimination statutes provide
unmarried couples is ill-defmed.29 Federal law provides little protection.
Neither Title VII nor the Civil Rights Act of 1866"' address discrimination
on the basis of marital status. 32 In two areas, however, lending and public
housing, federal law provides some level of protection to unmarried
33
couples.
The Equal Credit Opportunity Act expressly prohibits creditors from
discriminating on the basis of marital status.' In Markham v. Colonial
constitution); see also Carmella, supra note 14, at 275 (discussing willingness of several
state supreme courts to look to state constitutions to find greater degree of protection for
free exercise of religion); McCabe, supra note 25, at 49-50 (discussing protection offered
by state constitutions, which may be higher than, equal to, or less than protection provided
by First Amendment).
29. See infra notes 30-72 and accompanying text (discussing housing discrimination
statutes).
30. Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). The
Fair Housing Act prohibits the refusal to sell or rent a dwelling on the basis of race, color,
religion, sex, familial status, and national origin and, in some situations, prohibits the

refusal to-sell or rent to persons with children and to handicapped persons. Id. § 3604
(1988).
31. 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1988).
32. The Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 amended the Fair Housing Act and
expanded its scope to include a prohibition of discrimination based on "familial status." 42
U.S.C. §§ 3604, 3606 (1988) (as amended by Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988, Pub.
L. No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619 (1988)). However, "familial status," as defined by the Act,
focuses on the protection of a parent-child relationship and provides protection for individuals
under 18 domiciled with a parent or guardian, pregnant women, and persons in the process
of gaining legal custody over anyone under 18 years old. Id. § 3602; see also H.R. REP. No.
711, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1988) (noting that Fair Housing Amendments Act does not
prohibit discrimination on basis of marital status); MITCHELL BERNARD ET AL., THE RIGHTS
OF SINGLE PEOPLE 32 (Norman Dorsen ed., 1985) (recognizing that federal law allows
landlords to discriminate against unmarried couples); ROBERT G. SCHWEMM, HOUSING
DISCRIMINATION LAW 378 (1983) (noting lack of federal prohibition of marital status
discrimination); James A. Kushner, The FairHousingAmendments Act of 1988: The Second
Generation ofFairHousing, 42 VAND. L. REv. 1049, 1106 (1989) (stating that marital status
discrimination is "clearly not covered by Title VIII" unless such discrimination also has
disproportionate impact on certain race, sex, or religion protected under Title VII); Matthew
J. Smith,. Note, The Wages of Living in Sin: Discriminationin HousingAgainst Unmarried
Couples, 25 U.C. DAvIs. L. REv. 1055, 1068 (1992) (recognizing lack of express congressional prohibition of housing discrimination against unmarried couples).
33. See infra notes 34-43 and accompanying text (discussing federal protections offered
unmarried couples in lending and public housing).
34. Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691 (1994).
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Mortgage Service Co. ,35 the United States Court of Appeals for the District

of Columbia Circuit interpreted the term "marital status" to protect not only
individuals, but also a relationship between individuals.36 Thus, in the
context of lending, federal law protects unmarried couples.37
Unmarried couples also receive federal protection against discrimination
in public housing. In Hann v. Housing Authority,38 the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania found a restrictive interpretation of the term "family" employed by a local housing authority to be too

narrow a reading. 39 The court, relying on the United States Housing Act of
35. 605 F.2d 566 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
36. See Markham v. Colonial Mortgage Serv. Co., 605 F.2d 566, 569 (D.C. Cir. 1979)
(finding refusal to aggregate incomes of unmarried joint mortgage applicants to be
discrimination based on marital status and thus violation of Equal Credit Opportunity Act).
In Markham, the court considered whether a savings and loan's refusal to aggregate an
unmarried couple's income for credit application purposes was a violation of the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act. Id. The defendants rejected the plaintiffs' joint mortgage application
because the separate incomes of each were insufficient. Id. at 568. However, the plaintiffs
received notification that upon submission of a marriage certificate the lender would approve
the application. Id. The court, in examining the statute, recognized that the main purpose
behind the prohibition of discrimination on the basis of marital status was to discourage
creditors from refusing to consider the individual creditworthiness of married women. Id.
at 569. However, the court applied the clear language of the Act and found that the lender
should have treated the unmarried couple the same as a married couple. Id. at 569-70.
37. See SCHWEMM, supra note 32, at 378 (discussing significance of Markham in
interpreting marital status protections of Equal Credit Opportunity Act to encompass
protection of unmarried couples); Kushner, supra note 32, at 1106-07 (noting that federal law
protects unmarried couples in lending); John C. Beattie, Note, ProhibitingMarital Status
Discrimination:A Proposalfor the Protectionof UnmarriedCouples, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 1415,
1417-18 (1991) (noting coverage of marital status discrimination in lending by Equal Credit
Opportunity Act); Smith, supra note 32, at 1068-69 (discussing Markham and its significance
in extending protection to unmarried couples seeking credit in housing).
38. 709 F. Supp. 605 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
39. See Hann v. Housing Auth., 709 F. Supp. 605, 610 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (finding that
United States Housing Act of 1937 prohibited categorical exclusion of unmarried couples from
eligibility in low-income housing programs). In Hann, the court examined whether the Housing
Authority of the City of Easton violated the United States Housing Act of 1937, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1437-1437w (1988 & Supp. V 1993), and the Housing and Urban Development (HUD)
regulations promulgated to implement the statute when the Housing Authority's interpretation
of "family" resulted in a categorical exclusion of unmarried couples from low-income housing
assistance. Id. at 606-07. The plaintiffs were unmarried, but were the natural parents of two
children. Id. at 606. The local board denied their application for housing vouchers because it
did not consider them a family; the board interpreted "family" to include only persons related
"by blood, marriage or adoption." Id. According to the board, its primary reason for adopting
this regulation was its belief that cohabitation is immoral. Id. The United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania found the local board's definition of family too narrow
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1937' and Housing and Urban Development regulations promulgated to
support implementation of the Act, found the categorical exclusion of
unmarried couples from low-income housing programs unlawful. 41 The
denial of access to public housing also raises constitutional issues. In Atkisson v. Kern County Housing Authority,42 the California Court of Appeals
found an unmarried couple entitled to certain constitutional protections that
43
prevented discrimination in public housing on the basis of marital status.
Many states, moving to fill the void left by federal law, have enacted
statutes prohibiting discrimination on the basis of marital status.' However,
a reading of HUD's regulations. Id. at 610. The court examined the recent history of the
regulations defining marital status, which in 1977 protected persons who were "either related
by blood, marriage or operation of law, or have evidenced a stable family relationship." Id. at
607 (quoting 24 C.F.R. § 812.2(d)(1) (1977)). However, the next year an amendment to the
HUD appropriations bill effectively overruled this interpretation. Id. According to the court's
interpretation of the legislative history of this amendment, the reason for the amendment
abrogating the "stable family relationship" interpretation was not an attempt to categorically
exclude unmarried couples, but was rather a concern over the expansion of the interpretation
to include homosexual couples. Id. Thus, the district court found support for the inclusion of
unmarried couples within the definition of "family." Id. The court held that the narrow
interpretation categorically excluded unmarried couples from the program and thus was a
violation of the Uniform Housing Act of 1937. Id. at 610.
40. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437-1437w (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
41. Hann, 709 F. Supp. at 610.
42. 130 Cal. Rptr. 375 (Ct. App. 1976).
43. See Atkisson v. Kern County Hous. Auth., 130 Cal. Rptr. 375, 379-81 (Ct. App.
1976) (finding that local housing authority policy against unmarried couples violated regulations
promulgated by HUD and violated constitutional rights of tenant). In Atkisson, the court
examined the Kern County Housing Authority's policy forbidding tenants from living with
anyone of the opposite sex not related by blood, marriage, or adoption. Id. at 377. The
Authority initiated efforts to evict the plaintiff following notification that she was cohabiting
with an unrelated male. Id. The court presented several bases for invalidation of the local
policy. Id. at 379-81. First, the local policy violated regulations promulgated by HUD that
prevented the automatic restriction of access to a certain class because of criteria such as marital
status. Id. at 379. Second, the local policy violated the tenant's due process rights by creating
an irrebuttable presumption in automatically presuming "immorality, irresponsibility and
demoralization of tenant relations from the fact of unmarried cohabitation." Id. at 380. Third,
the local policy violated the tenant's right to equal protection by improperly assuming a
connection between the "undesirable conduct associated with the class" and the individual's
conduct. Id. Finally, the prohibition on cohabitation would, under circumstances in which the
unmarried couple had children of their own, restrict a parent from living with his or her child
and thus would infringe on the family's right to privacy. Id. at 381.
44. See ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.240 (1994); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12955 (West 1992 &
Supp. 1996); COLO. REv. STAT. § 24-34-502 (1988 & Supp. 1995); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 46a-64c (West 1995); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 4603 (1993); HAw. REv. STAT. § 515-3
(1985 & Supp. 1992); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 68, para. 1-103, 3-102 (Smith-Hurd 1989 & Supp.
1992); MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, § 22 (1994); MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 151B, § 4 (West
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due to the unclear nature of the term "marital status," these statutes have had
varying degrees of success in protecting unmarried couples. 5 Because most
of the state statutes fail to define marital status, the duty to interpret and thus,
the determination of the scope of the protection offered is in almost every
situation thrust upon the state courts. 46
Some courts have adopted a "narrow view" that only protects individuals
in their status as single, married, or divorced, as opposed to a more inclusive
approach that would include the relationship between individuals. 47 For ex1996); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 37.2502 (West 1985 & Supp. 1995); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 363.03(2) (West 1991 & Supp. 1996); MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-305 (1995); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 354-A:8 (1995); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12(g)-(h) (West 1993 & Supp. 1995);
N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 296(5) (McKinney 1993); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-12 (1991 & Supp.
1995); OR. REV. STAT. § 659.033 (1993); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-37-4 (1995); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 9, § 4503 (1993); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.222 (West 1990 & Supp. 1996); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 101.22 (West 1988 & Supp. 1995); see also BERNARD, supra note 32, at 32
(recognizing attempts made by states to supplement federal housing discrimination laws to
prohibit marital status discrimination); Smith, supra note 32, at 1074 & n.80 (noting states that
have enacted laws to prohibit marital status discrimination). A few municipalities also have
passed fair housing laws, some of which address marital status discrimination. See ANCHORAGE, ALASKA, MUN. CODE § 5.20.020 (prohibiting refusal to rent to person because of marital
status, except in individual home in which tenant would share common living areas); PRINCE
GEORGE'S COUNTY, MD., CODE § 2-186(a)(3) (1991) (including marital status within scope of
antidiscrimination ordinance).
45. See infra notes 47-72 and accompanying text (discussing definition of "marital status"
as applied by courts in determining whether statutes protect unmarried couples). Some state
legislatures have specifically demonstrated an intent not to protect unmarried couples. See
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-64c(b)(2) (West Supp. 1995) (excluding unmarried couples from
protection of statute); OR. REV. STAT. § 659.033(5) (1993) (same). Other state legislatures have
attempted to define marital status, but these definitions do not directly address unmarried
couples. See ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 68, para. 1-1030) (Smith-Hurd 1989 & Supp. 1992) (defining
"marital status" as legal status of being married, single, separated, divorced or widowed); MD.'
ANN. CODE art. 49B, §20(n) (1994) (same); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.01(24) (West 1991)
(defining "marital status" as "whether a person is single, married, remarried, divorced,
separated, or a surviving spouse"); see also Beattie, supra note 37, at 1418 & n.16 (discussing
relatively small number of statutes that define "marital status"); Smith, supra note 32, at 107576 nn.82-83 (noting that few state statutes define "marital status" and that those that do, do not
expressly discuss unmarried couples).
46. See infra notes 47-72 and accompanying text (examining courts' discussion of
protections available to unmarried couples under antidiscrimination statutes).
47. See infra notes 48-66 and accompanying text (discussing narrow interpretation of
marital status protection); see also Robert C. Mueller, Donahue v. Fair Employment and
Housing Commission: A FreeExercise Defense to Marital Status Discrimination?,74 B.U. L.
REV. 145, 149-54 (1994) (applying current jurisprudence on interpretation of "marital status"
to court's application in Donahue v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n); Beattie, supra note
37, at 1419-28 (examining courts' interpretations of the term "marital status" and classifying
views into either broad or narrow interpretation); Rita M. Neuman, Note, Closing the Door on
CohabitantsUnder Wisconsin's Open HousingLaw, 1995 Wis. L. REv. 965, 972-75 (discussing
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ample, a landlord could not refuse a tenant housing because she was divorced,
but could deny a tenant housing because she was divorced and living with
another man. In making this interpretation, courts have often looked beyond
the language of the statute to extrinsic evidence, including other statutory
provisions and the policy behind those statutes.48
In Mister v. A.R.K. Partnership,49 the Appellate Court of Illinois determined that a state law prohibiting discrimination on the basis of marital status
did not protect unmarried couples.50 Recognizing that the statutory language
itself was open to varying interpretations, the court looked to other statutes for
guidance.5 ' In this investigation, the court examined the public policy reasons
behind the state's criminal prohibition on fornication and the statutory
renunciation of common-law marriages.5 3 The Mister court found the attempted application of the antidiscrimination statute inconsistent with the
state's policy against cohabitation and the state's refusal to recognize the
"private alternative" offered by common-law marriage.'
Thus, the anticases interpreting "marital status"); Smith, supra note 32, at 1078-91 (same).
48. See Beattie, supra note 37, at 1422 (recognizing application of "narrow rule" of
marital status discrimination in housing); Smith, supra note 32, at 1082 (noting that courts have
used "variety of extrinsic aids" in interpreting statutes involved).
49. 553 N.E.2d 1152 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
50. See Mister v. A.R.K. Partnership, 553 N.E.2d 1152, 1159 (Ill.
App. Ct.) (denying
discrimination protection to unmarried couple), appeal denied, 561 N.E.2d 694 (ll.
1990). In
Mister, the Appellate Court of Illinois examined whether the Illinois Human Rights Act, which
prohibited discrimination on the basis of marital status, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, pars. 1-102(A),
3-102(A), protected unmarried cohabitation. Mister, 553 N.E.2d at 1156-57. The plaintiffs,
two unmarried couples denied apartments solely because they were not married, brought a
complaint before the Human Rights Commission. Id. at 1154. The plaintiffs also sought a
temporary restraining order enjoining the defendants from renting the apartments sought by
plaintiffs. Id. Following the trial court's entry of the order, the defendants appealed. Id. The
court of appeals, after concluding that the plaintiffs did not fall within the protection of the
Human Rights Act, found that the lower court had abused its discretion in finding that the plaintiffs demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits and had erred in granting injunctive
relief. Id. at 1160.
51. Id. at 1156-57.
52. Id. at 1157 (referring to statute criminalizing fornication if it is "open and notorious"). The statute provided that anyone "who cohabits or has sexual intercourse with another
not his spouse commits fornication if the behavior is open or notorious." Id. The court noted
that, although the statute had fallen into disuse, it still evidenced the "relevant moral standards
of this State, as declared by our legislature." Id. (quoting Jarrett v. Jarrett, 400 N.E.2d 421
(1979)). The court answered the plaintiffs' claim that their cohabitation was not "open and
notorious" by finding the attempt to rent an apartment sufficient to satisfy the requirement.
Id. at 1158.
53. Id. at 1157.
54. Id. at 1158-59.
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discrimination statute did not apply when a landlord refused to rent to
unmarried persons of the opposite sex. 5
Prince George's County v. Greenbelt Homes, Inc.56 is another case in
which a court determined legislative intent by looking to other state
statutes. 7 The Maryland Court of Special Appeals examined a local ordinance prohibiting actions that adversely affected persons on the basis of
marital status." This inquiry attempted to determine whether the statute

protected an unmarried couple who were denied membership to a housing
cooperative solely because they were not married.5 ' The court found that the

statute protected the individual marital status of each complainant, but not
their union as a couple.'

Noting that state law denied recognition of

common-law marriages and other illegitimate unions, the court refused to
allow the antidiscrimination law to override the policy decisions made by the
legislature and courts in denying recognition of legal status to certain relationships. 6
In State by Cooper v. French,62 the Minnesota Supreme Court relied on
state policies against fornication and in favor of marriage in defining "marital status" to exclude unmarried couples.63 In French, a landlord refused to
55. Id. at 1159.
56. 431 A.2d 745 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1981).
57. See Prince George's County v. Greenbelt Homes, Inc., 431 A.2d 745, 747-48 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 1981) (interpreting "marital status" discrimination to exclude protection of
unmarried couple seeking membership in housing cooperative). In Prince George's County,
the county brought an action against Greenbelt Homes, a cooperative housing development.
Id. at 746-47. The county sought to enforce an order by the county's Human Relations
Commission (Commission) that required the defendants to revise their membership agreements and ownership contracts to eliminate discrimination. Id. at 747. As a matter of policy,
Greenbelt Homes limited occupancy of the dwelling units to members and their immediate
families. Id. at 746. The Commission found fault with the "generally accepted" interpretation of family employed by Greenbelt, which excluded unmarried couples, and instead
advocated a much broader definition that would include two or more adults living together.
Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 747-48.
60. Id. The court, discussing the position of the complainants, noted that "[wihile each
separately had a marital status, collectively they did not." Id. at 748.
61. Id. In its examination of the relevant policy issues, the court relied on the "procedural prerequisites for legitimizing marriages" and the "statutory condemnation" of other relationships. Id.; see also Maryland Comm'n on Human Relations v. Greenbelt Homes, Inc.,
475 A.2d 1192, 1197 (Md. 1984) (relying on Prince George's County's discussion of public
policy promoting marriage).
62. 460 N.W.2d 2 (Minn. 1990).
63. See State by Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 5-6 (Minn. 1990) (determining
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rent to an unmarried couple on religious grounds.' 4 The court, finding that
the state legislature had expressed a policy against fornication, interpreted
the term "marital status" to exclude unmarried couples.65 Thus, the court

did not afford unmarried couples the protection of the antidiscrimination
statute on the ground that this result would punish the landlord for refusing
to disregard the fornication statute.6 6

Many courts do, however, support a broad interpretation of the term

"marital status" to include unmarried couples within the realm of protection
offered by antidiscrimination statutes. 67 These cases rely on both statutory
language that defines the "person" protected by the statute to include both
the singular and plural and on an "ordinary meaning" approach that finds

that the ordinary meaning of marital status includes couples.68 In Donahue
v. FairEmployment and Housing Commission,69 the Court of Appeals for.
California's Second District looked beyond the statutory language to deterlegislative intent in order to define "marital status" by examination of fornication statute and
legislative definition of "marital status" which limits protection only to employment discrimination cases).
64. Id. at 3.
65. Id. at 7.
66. Id. at 10. The court rejected the respondents' argument that the fornication statute
no longer expressed state policy because it had "fallen into complete disuse" and answered
that the idea of "implied repeal" of the fornication statute was without precedent or factual
support. Id. at 6. The court noted that while there may be some question as to whether
fornication actually would take place on the property, the important point was the landlord's
religious belief against unmarried people living together, regardless of any sexual activity that
might occur. Id. at 10 n.5.
67. See, e.g., Foreman v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 779 P.2d 1199, 1203
(Alaska 1989) (affording unmarried couples protection from discrimination); Donahue v. Fair
Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 32, 38 (Ct. App. 1991) (same), review
granted, 825 P.2d 766 (Cal. 1992), review dismissed and cause remanded, 859 P.2d 671
(Cal. 1993); Worcester Hous. Auth. v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 547
N.E.2d 43, 45 (Mass. 1989) (same); see also Mueller, supra note 47, at 149-52 (discussing
Donahue's application of definition of "person" in antidiscrimination statute to include "one
or more individuals"); Beattie, supra note 37, at 1427 (noting that inclusive interpretation
prohibits use of "marital status classification as a determining factor"); Smith, supra note 32,
at 1078-82 (noting use of "plain meaning" approach to include unmarried couples in antidiscrimination statute's scope of protection).
68. See Foreman, 779 P.2d at 1201 (interpreting statute to give words their "ordinary
and common meaning"); Worcester, 547 N.E.2d at 45 (finding language of statute "reasonably straightforward"). In both cases, however, the courts also looked to statutory language
that refers to "person" in both the singular and plural. Foreman, 779 P.2d at 1201-02;
Worcester,547 N.E.2d at 45. For example, the Foreman court referred to statutory language
defining person as "one or more individual." Foreman,779 P.2d at 1201-02.
69. 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 32 (Ct. App. 1991).
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mine the legislative intent behind the use of the term "marital status."70 The
court found that the legislature's failure to take action following a judicial
interpretation of the antidiscrimination statute to include unmarried couples
within the scope of protection amounted to acquiescence on the part of the
legislature in the court's interpretation. 7' The court also noted statutory
language defining "person" to include "one or more individuals" and the

absence of any state prohibition of cohabitation or fornication as support for
its definition of "marital status."' Because the Donahue court adopted a
broad interpretation of marital status protection, it did not have to reach the
question of whether it should grant a religious exercise exemption.
IV. The Conflict: Religious Exercise Versus the Eradicationof
DiscriminationAgainst Unmarried Couples
An examination of the conflict between a landlord's religious exercise

and statutes prohibiting discrimination based on marital status requires a twostep analysis. First, a court must interpret "marital status" to determine
whether the statute in fact protects unmarried couples.7 3 Before a free-

exercise analysis is necessary, a landlord must have in fact violated an
antidiscrimination statute.74

If defined narrowly, 75 the statute does not

70. See Donahue v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 32, 37 (Ct.
App. 1991) (examining previous case law as well as legislature's failure to change law
following decision that protected unmarried couple), review granted, 825 P.2d 766 (Cal.
1992), review dismissed and cause remanded, 859 P.2d 671 (Cal. 1993). In Donahue, the
court referred to Atkisson v. Kern County Hous. Auth., 130 Cal. Rptr. 375 (Ct. App. 1976),
which found the denial of public housing to unmarried couples to be a violation of the
statutory prohibition against marital status discrimination. Donahue, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 37.
Following Atkisson, the legislature amended parts of the antidiscrimination statute without
altering the statute to rebut the judicial interpretation of Atkisson. Id. The Donahue court
found this failure to amend an "acquiescence in this judicial interpretation." Id.
71. Donahue, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 37.
72. Id. at 37-38.
73. See supranotes 45-72 (examining struggle to define level of protection that prohibitions against marital status discrimination provide unmarried couples).
74. In the not-so-distant past, landlords were entitled to refuse to rent for any reason.
See ROBERT S. SCHOSHINSKI, AMERICAN LAW OF LANDLORD AND TENANT § 11.1 (1980)
(discussing relatively recent history of tenant protection from landlord discrimination).
75. See, e.g., Mister v. A.R.K. Partnership, 553 N.E.2d 1152, 1159 (Ill. App. Ct.)
(finding that landlord's refusal to rent to unmarried couple did not violate antidiscrimination
law), appeal denied, 561 N.E.2d 694 (Ill. 1990); State by Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d
2, 7 (Minn. 1990) (finding that landlord's refusal to rent to unmarried couple did not violate
statute prohibiting marital status discrimination); see also supra notes 47-66 (examining
decisions that have interpreted term "marital status" narrowly to exclude unmarried couples
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protect unmarried couples, the landlord needs no exemption, and the analysis
proceeds no further. However, if a court interprets marital status broadly 76

to include unmarried couples within the statute's scope of protection, it must
then conduct a free exercise analysis to determine whether the landlord's free
exercise rights trump the application of the statute.'
The cases that have considered whether a landlord should have a free
exercise exemption have applied the balancing test of Sherbert and its
progeny.78 The analysis consists of the following determinations: (1) did the

from protection of antidiscrimination statute).
76. See, e.g., Smith v. Commission of Fair Employment & Hous., 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d.
395 (Ct. App.) (finding statute that prohibited housing discrimination based on marital status
protected unmarried couples), review granted, 880 P.2d 111 (Cal. 1994); Donahue v. Fair
Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 32, 38 (Ct. App. 1991) (same), review
granted, 825 P.2d 766 (Cal. 1992), review dismissed and cause remanded, 859 P.2d 671
(Cal. 1993); Attorney Gen. v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233, 235 (Mass. 1994) (same); see also
supra notes 67-72 (discussing decisions broadly interpreting marital status to include
unmarried couples within antidiscrimination statute's protection).
77. See generally Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274, 280,
284 (Alaska) (allowing application of antidiscrimination statute to landlord to stand despite
conflict with landlord's religious beliefs), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct 460 (1994); Smith, 30 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 412 (finding application of state antidiscrimination statute to landlord whose
religious beliefs prevented her from renting to unmarried couple unconstitutional); Donahue,
2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 46 (finding landlords entitled to exemption because protecting unmarried
couples from discrimination was not sufficiently compelling to override free exercise rights);
Desilets, 636 N.E.2d at 241 (conducting balancing test of compelling state interest against
burden placed on landlord to determine whether landlord is entitled to free exercise
exemption).
78. See Swanner, 874 P.2d at 280-84 (applying balancing test); Smith, 30 Cal. Rptr.
2d at 403-10 (same); Donahue,2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 41-45 (same); Desilets, 636 N.E.2d at 23643, and n.5 (same); see also Swanner, 115 S. Ct. at 462 n.2 (1994) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(recognizing use of Sherbert-Yoder test by courts considering whether state may burden
landlord's free exercise by application of antidiscrimination statute). Swanner examined both
federal and state constitutional protections of free exercise. See Swanner, 874 P.2d at 279,
281 (applying "general applicability" test of Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 885
(1990), to federal claims and Sherbert test for state constitutional claims). Smith examined
federal protections under the "hybrid" situation of Employment Div., 494 U.S. at 884-85,
which retained the compelling state interest balancing test of Sherbert and state protections
under a Sherbert test. See Smith, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 401, 403 (finding hybrid situation and
applying balancing test). The remaining courts examined only the religious protections
offered by the respective state constitutions. See Donahue, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 40 (recognizing
that California Supreme Court had indeed adopted balancing test as matter of state
constitutional law); Desilets, 636 N.E.2d at 236 (recognizing independence of state court's
interpretation of state constitution in adopting balancing test); see also supra notes 8-28 and
accompanying text (discussing development of free exercise doctrine and appropriate test for
determining whether courts should grant free exercise exemptions). Additionally, with the
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landlord violate the antidiscrimination statute as a result of a sincerely held
religious belief, 9 (2) would the application of the statute substantially burden

this exercise," (3) does the state have a compelling interest in the application
of this statute,"1 and (4) is this statute the least restrictive means for advancing the state interest?'

A. Sincerely Held Religious Belief
The strict scrutiny test first requires a showing of a sincerely held
religious belief.8 3 The truth or correctness of this belief may not be questioned; the examination ends with the determination that the belief exists.'
For example, according to the court in Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights

Commission,8 to qualify for a religious exemption a landlord must first
show: (1) the conduct involves religion, (2) religion is the basis for the
conduct in question, and (3) the claimant is sincere in his religious belief.s"
recent enactment of RFRA, the compelling state interest test is once again the applicable
standard for federal religious exercise analysis. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (Supp. V 1993)
(restoring compelling interest test).
79. See infra notes 83-89 and accompanying text (discussing requirement of sincerely
held religious belief).
80. See infra notes 90-114 and accompanying text (examining burden statute creates).
81. See infra notes 115-65 and accompanying text (examining state's interest in
application of the statute).
82. See infra notes 166-69 and accompanying text (discussing least restrictive means
requirement).
83. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 399 n.1 (1963) (noting no question as to
sincerity of appellant's religious beliefs); see also Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 71516 (1981) (focusing examination on whether religious beliefs were basis for appellant's
action).
84. See Thomas, 450 U.S. at 716 (finding that role of court in this inquiry is solely to
determine honesty of belief). The Thomas Court stated that courts "are not arbiters of
scriptural interpretation." Id. However, the Court did note the potential existence of claims
"so bizarre, so clearly nonreligious in motivation, as not to be entitled to protection." Id. at
715; see United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86-87 (1944) (finding that First Amendment
precludes submitting question of truth of religious belief to jury). In Ballard,the defendants
claimed, among other things, to have the power to heal and to have shaken hands with Jesus.
Id. at 80-81. The Court acknowledged that some might find the claims "preposterous," but
reiterated the point that the truth of such beliefs was not subject to judgment by the jury. Id.
at 87.
85. 874 P.2d 274 (Alaska 1994).
86. Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274, 281 (Alaska)
(refusing to grant free exercise exemption to landlord discriminating against unmarried
couple), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 460 (1994). In Swanner, the court considered both the
federal and state protections of the landlord's religious freedom. Id. at 279-84. Examining
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However, these beliefs must be of a religious nature.' Obviously, defining
"religion" is a daunting task, especially when attempting to include those

groups or individuals who are outside of America's religious mainstream.'
To date, the cases examining landlord discrimination against unmarried
couples on the basis of religious beliefs have not challenged whether the
landlord's beliefs were in fact religious.A9
first the rights protected by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, the court
applied the Employment Div. v. Smith test. Id. at 279-80. Finding the state and municipal
antidiscrimination statutes both neutral and generally applicable, the court found no need to
determine whether a compelling state interest existed and ruled that enforcement of the statute
against the landlord did not violate his federal free exercise rights. Id. Next, the court
examined religious protection offered by the Alaska Constitution and applied the traditional
compelling interest test to determine whether to grant a religious exemption. Id. at 280-84.
The court balanced the burden placed on the landlord's religious exercise and the compelling
nature of the state interest and refused to grant a religious exemption to the landlord. Id. at
279-84.
87. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 216 (1972) (distinguishing "philosophical
and personal" beliefs from religious conviction).
88. See Allan Ides, The Text of the Free Exercise Clause as a Measure of Employment
Division v. Smith and the Religious Freedom RestorationAct, 51 WASH. &LEE L. REv. 135,
138 (1994) (recognizing that simply asking "[wlhat is religion ... hints at the complexity and
potential futility of the inquiry"). The judicial interpretation of the conscientious objector
clause of the draft laws, which provides for a broad interpretation of the meaning of religion,
provides some guidance. In United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965), the Court
considered a belief to be religious if it "occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel
to that filled by the God of those admittedly qualifying for the exemption." Id. at 176. This
broad definition of religion, while apparently more protective of some minority or
nontraditional religions, may have negative repercussions. See Ellis West, The Case Against
a Right to Religion-BasedExemptions, 4 NoTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 591, 598
(1990) (referring to some scholars' concerns about over-inclusive definition of religion and
negative effects of such interpretations on government regulation). Alternatively, the broad
definition may have discouraged courts from finding religious based exemptions more
frequently by diminishing the significance of religious belief. Id. at 599. See generally Jesse
H. Choper, Defining "Religion" in the First Amendment, 1982 U. ILL. L. REv. 579
(examining various possible definitions of "religion" and recognizing lack of serious
examination of definition by Supreme Court); Stephen G. Gey, Why Is Religion Special?:
Reconsidering the Accommodation of Religion Under the Religion Clauses of the First
Amendment, 52 U. PrrT. L. REV. 75 (1990) (discussing role of definition of religion in
application of accommodation principle); Note, Toward a Constitutional Definition of
Religion, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1056 (1978) (advocating expansive functional definition of
religion in free exercise context).
89. See Donahue v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 32, 38 (Ct.
App. 1991) (limiting discussion of religious nature of belief to statement: "[The landlords]
are devout Roman Catholics who believe that sexual intercourse outside of marriage is a
mortal sin and that to assist or facilitate such behavior also constitutes a sin"), review granted,
825 P.2d 766 (Cal. 1992), review granted and cause remanded, 859 P.2d 671 (Cal. 1993).
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B. SubstantialBurden on Religious Exercise
The determination of whether or not the application of an antidiscrim-

ination statute substantially burdens a landlord's religious exercise is a
difficult one. One can interpret the phrase "religious exercise," as utilized
by the Free Exercise Clause, in more than one way. At a minimum, reli-

gious exercise encompasses ritual acts, such as praying or other religious
ceremonies.'

One also can interpret it more broadly to include other con-

duct that, although not considered to be ritual or ceremony, is motivated or
guided by religious considerations." Thus, the extent of the burden imposed
by the statute turns in large part on the interpretation of religious exercise
that the court employs.
In Donahue, the court interpreted religious exercise broadly and found

that it encompassed not only religious ceremony, but also the actions of
everyday life guided by religious beliefs and ethics.' The court found that
application of the statute burdened the landlords because it forced them
either to stand by their religious beliefs and suffer the monetary sanctions
imposed by the antidiscrimination statute or to modify their behavior and
rent to unmarried couples.93 The burden placed on the landlords' religious

actions involved an affirmative obligation under threat of monetary sanctions.' The Donahue court recognized that religious belief did not demand
the landlords' voluntary entrance into the housing market, but nonetheless
refused to find their entrance into commercial activity dispositive of the

question of the burden placed on the landlords.95 Although the landlords'
90. See ides, supra note 88, at 143 (examining text of Free Exercise Clause as would
public at time of its drafting to possibly refer only to "acts of worship, ceremony, and the
like").
91. See id. (discussing an alternate interpretation of religious exercise to refer more
generally to "all conduct taken in accord with the principles of a religion").
92. Donahue,2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 49. However, Justice Grignon, in his dissent, argued
that the burden on religion is slight. Id. at 49 (Grignon, J., dissenting). He noted that
refusing to rent to unmarried couples is not a central tenet of the landlords' religion. Id.
(Grignon, J., dissenting). He found "no religious motivations for their conduct." Id.
(Grignon, J., dissenting).
93. Id. at 43.
94. Id. at 42.
95. Id. at 42-43; cf. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257-58, 261 (1982) (noting
that, upon entrance into commercial activity, those of particular sect may not superimpose
their own beliefs on statutory scheme that controls others who have entered into that activity,
but that government still must justify regulation of religious liberty in name of overriding
government interest). But see Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization, 493 U.S.
378, 389-90 (1990) (finding no significant burden on free exercise when state applied
generally applicable sales tax to retail sales of religious material); Kelly D. Eckel, Comment,
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religious beliefs did not require that they enter the market, the Donahue
court noted that a person does not lose the right to free exercise simply
because the conflict arises in a commercial setting.96 The court recognized
that this burden placed on the landlords was substantial, despite the commer-

cial context.

7

In Attorney General v. Desilets," a recent Massachusetts case address-

ing the conflict between religious exercise rights and prohibitions against
marital status discrimination, the court found that conduct motivated by
religious belief was an exercise of religion." The court, stating that the
statute required the landlords either to enter into a contract contrary to their
religious beliefs or to face economic sanctions, found a burden on the landlords' exercise of religion."t The court did not consider the commercial
context of the religious conduct relevant in its determination of the burden
on the landlords' religious exercise, but found that the commercial context
was pertinent to the balancing test arising later in the analysis.' 0 '

Legitimate Limitation of a Landlord's Rights - A New Dawn for UnmarriedCohabitants,68
TEMP. L.Q. 811, 840-45 (1995) (advocating that courts focus on commercial context of
dispute to deny landlord's free exercise exemptions); Markey, supra note 2, at 817-20
(arguing that business of leasing apartments has no relationship to religious exercise).
96. Donahue v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 32, 42-43 (Ct.
App. 1991), review granted, 825 P.2d 766 (Cal. 1992), review dismissed and cause
remanded, 859 P.2d 671 (Cal. 1993).
97. Id. at 43.
98. 636 N.E.2d 233 (Mass. 1994).
99. See Attorney Gen. v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233, 237 (Mass. 1994) (finding action
based on belief was exercise of religion). In Desilets, the court examined whether the application of an antidiscrimination statute protecting unmarried couples from housing discrimination was a violation of the landlords' right to the free exercise of religion under the
Massachusetts state constitution. Id. at 235. The landlords refused to rent to an unmarried
couple because they believed that facilitating cohabitation was sinful. Id. at 234-35. This
action arose as an appeal to the superior court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the
landlords. Id. at 235. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, in its analysis, first
found that the landlords had in fact violated the antidiscrimination statute. Id. Next, it
examined the state constitutional protection of free exercise, declared the state's prerogative
to interpret its constitution in a manner independent of federal jurisprudence, and reaffirmed
the use of the balancing test applied in Sherbert and Yoder. Id. at 235-36. The court found
the landlords' right to free exercise was substantially burdened and remanded the case to
determine if a state interest existed which was so compelling that it would preclude an
exception to the statute. Id. at 237-41.
100. Id. at 237.
101. Id. at 238. The court, discussing the weight that the lower court should give to the
landlords' interest in the balancing test to be applied on remand, distinguished between
"formal religious activity" and "the business of leasing apartments." Id. at 241.
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In like manner, the court in Smith v. Commission of FairEmployment
and Housing"° regarded a landlord's actions based on religious beliefs to be
religious exercise.103 The Smith court found that the choice presented to a
landlord, whether to remain faithful to her religious beliefs and suffer sanctions or to rent to an unmarried couple, was a substantial infringement on her
fundamental fights." 4 Both the state and federal constitutions provided protection for the landlord. 0 5 Examining the burden imposed on the landlord, the
court determined that although the application of the statute was only indirectly compulsive, its burden was substantial. "
Alternatively, the Swanner court narrowly interpreted religious exercise.' 07 The court distinguished religious belief from conduct and found less
protection for the latter.' Additionally, the Swanner court found that commercial conduct received less protection than did directly religious activity. "
The court made a distinction between religious observance and commercial

activity and found a lower level of protection for those who voluntarily enter
the commercial market.

0

The court discredited the landlord's argument that

102. 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 395 (Ct. App. 1994).
103. Smith v. Commission of Fair Employment & Hous., 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 395, 406
(Ct. App.) (finding religious exemption to antidiscrimination statute), review granted, 880
P.2d 111 (Cal. 1994). In Smith, the court analyzed the federal protections offered the
landlord under the hybrid test of Employment Div. v. Smith, which required a showing of
a violation of both free exercise rights and an additional constitutional protection, in this
case the freedom of speech. Id. at 401. As a penalty for violating the antidiscrimination
statute, the Commission of Fair Employment and Housing required the landlord to post a
notice in her rental units, signed by her, that she was guilty of said violation. Id. The
court found that the requirement to post notices proclaiming concepts contrary to her
religious beliefs was a violation of her First Amendment right of free speech. Id. at 402.
Both the hybrid test of Employment Div. v. Smith and the state constitutional analysis
required a balancing test of the landlord's free exercise rights versus the compelling state
interest. Id. at 403.
104. Id. at 406.
105. Id. at 406, 412.
106. Id.at 406.
107. Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274, 283 (Alaska), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 460 (1994).
108. Id.at 279.
109. Id. at 283.
110. Id. In his dissent, Chief Justice Moore disputed the majority's finding that a clear
distinction between religious beliefs and religious acts exists and argued that conduct
motivated by sincere religious belief is "presumptively protected." Id. at 288 n.3 (Moore,
C.J., dissenting). In addition, Chief Justice Moore challenged the contention that voluntary
entrance into commerce constitutes a waiver of constitutionally protected free exercise when
that exercise conflicts with state legislation. Id. at 290 (Moore, C.J., dissenting).

SHOULD FREE EXERCISE PROTECT LANDLORD BIAS?
he must either give up his livelihood or contradict his religious belief and
found that the landlord's "Hobson's choice" resulted from his decision to enter
the market.1 1 According to the court, the burden faced by the landlord arose
as a result of his choice to enter into a commercial activity regulated in part
that what little burden
by antidiscrimination laws."' Thus, the court believed
3
was in fact borne by the landlord was self-imposed.
A broad interpretation of religious exercise provides a greater degree of
protection to religious freedom."' For many, religion is not simply ceremony
and ritual, but a way of life that guides daily conduct. In addition, it would
be unwise to limit exercise to religious worship because to do so would likely
force a judicial interpretation of what the definition of ritual or ceremony
includes. Thus, the courts would have discretion to determine what conduct
is so important to an individual so as to constitute an act of worship. Such a
limitation could prove very restrictive, especially to those minority religions
outside of America's mainstream. Therefore, courts should employ the broad
reading of religious exercise, with the consequence that the application of an
antidiscrimination statute to landlords refusing to rent to unmarried couples
on the basis of religious belief would constitute a substantial burden on
religious freedom.
C. Compelling State Interest
Following an examination of the landlord's free exercise rights, the court
must explore the government's interest in the application of an antidiscrimination statute. A court may interpret the state interest broadly to encompass
a prohibition of all forms of discrimination." 5 Alternatively, the state's
111. Id. at283.
112. Id. But see Donahue v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 32,

43 (Ct. App. 1991) (recognizing that religion is not merely ritual or ceremony, but more "a
system of moral beliefs and ethical guideposts which regulate one's daily life"), review
granted, 825 P.2d 766 (Cal. 1992), review dismissed and cause remanded, 859 P.2d 671

(Cal. 1993).
113. Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274, 283 (Alaska), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 460 (1994). See Markey, supra note 2, at 822-24 (viewing landlord's
burden as both self-imposed and arbitrarily created). Professor Markey argued that there is
no constitutionally cognizable burden involved because the First Amendment does not give
landlords the right to "dictate the conduct of third parties to suit landlords' religious beliefs."
Id. at 822 n.550. Assuming, however, that the statute burdens the landlords' religious
exercise, Professor Markey asserts that the burden is self-imposed. Id.
114. Cf Ides, supra note 88, at 141-43, 147-51 (discussing meaning of term "exercise"
in text of Free Exercise Clause).
115. See infra notes 126-31 and accompanying text (discussing broad interpretation of
government's interest in enforcing antidiscrimination statute).
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interest may be more narrow and prohibit only discrimination against unmarried couples." 6 The determination of whether the government's interest is

compelling appears to turn on this characterization. "
In the cases that have found that a landlord's religious exercise rights
outweighed the government's interest, the courts have limited that interest
to prohibiting discrimination against unmarried couples.'
Courts denying

compelling state interest status to marital status discrimination do not examine the state interest in preventing discrimination in general, but focus
specifically on marital status discrimination." 9 These courts refused to find
all classes protected by antidiscrimination statutes entitled to an equal level
of protection, but instead distinguished the state interest in prohibiting

marital status discrimination from the state interest in eradicating other types
of discrimination.'11 In Smith, for example, the court distinguished the
prevention of. racial discrimination from the prevention of marital status
discrimination and found a higher state interest in the elimination of racial

discrimination. '' The court recognized that racial classification always
requires strict scrutiny, but found no similar requirement for marital status

116. See infra notes 118-25 and accompanying text (examining narrow state interest).
117. See, e.g., Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274, 283
(Alaska) (finding compelling state interest in eliminating discrimination based on "irrelevant
characteristics"), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 460 (1994); Smith v. Commission of Fair
Employment & Hous., 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 395, 406 (Ct. App.) (finding no compelling state
interest in protecting unmarried couples), review granted, 880 P.2d 111 (Cal. 1994);
Donahue v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 32, 44 (Ct. App. 1991)
(same), review granted, 825 P.2d 766 (Cal. 1992), review dismissed and cause remanded,
859 P.2d 671 (Cal. 1993); Attorney Gen. v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233, 238 (Mass. 1994)
(limiting state interest to elimination of discrimination against unmarried couples); see also
Markey, supra note 2, at 788 (recognizing importance of characterization of state's interest
in determining whether interest is compelling).
118. See Smith, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 404 (narrowly defining state interest); Donahue,
2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 44-45 (limiting government interest to prohibiting discrimination against
unmarried couples).
119. See Donahue, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 44 (stating that focus of inquiry must be
'particular nature of the discrimination at issue").
120. See Smith, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 404 (finding no support in statutory language or
legislative history for any particular hierarchy of protected interests and postulating that
legislature did not intend classifications to have equal priority); Donahue, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d
at 44 (requiring state to look beyond general compelling interest in eradicating discrimination and to focus on particular discrimination at issue).
121. Smith, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 404. The court noted that the state interest in the elimination of marital status discrimination does not enjoy equal priority with the state interest
in the elimination of racial discrimination. Id.

SHOULD FREE EXERCISE PROTECTLANDLORD BIAS?
discrimination.' In like manner, the Donahue court acknowledged that the
state's interest in eliminating discrimination varied according to each protected class."2 For example, the court recognized a fundamental overriding

interest in the eradication of racial discrimination in education.

24

According

to the court, the eradication of marital status discrimination, however, was
not a highly valued state interest."

In Swanner, however, the court utilized a dual characterization of the
state's interest. " The court found that the prohibition of marital status
discrimination advanced two distinct state interests.127 First, the court noted
the state's "derivative" interest in ensuring access to housing for all
people.
Second, the court found a "transactional" interest in preventing
discrimination based on "irrelevant characteristics." 2 9 The Swanner court
refused to distinguish between the classes protected by the antidiscrimination

statute and placed the prohibition of marital status discrimination on the same
level as the prohibition of other types of discrimination.13" In so doing, the
court found a general compelling interest in eradicating discrimination based
122. Id.
123. Donahue v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 32, 44 (Ct. App.
1991), review granted, 825 P.2d 766 (Cal. 1992), review dismissed and cause remanded, 859
P.2d 671 (Cal. 1993).
124. Id.; see generally Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (finding
compelling government interest in ending racial discrimination in education).
125. Donahue, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 44.
126. Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274, 282 (Alaska), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 460 (1994); see also David Kushner, Note, Free Exercise, FairHousing
and Marital Status- Alaskan Style, 12 ALASKAL. REv. 335, 378-90 (1995) (examining twofold government interest test utilized in Swanner).
127. Swanner, 874 P.2d at 282.
128. Id. The court defined derivative interests to apply to acts that on their face are not
objectionable, but have a negative impact on some other variable of government interest. Id.
In Swanner, the state interest was universal access to housing. Id.
129. Id. The transactional interest is the state interest in preventing discrimination,
regardless of whether the prospective tenants eventually find housing elsewhere. Id. Thus,
it is the act of discrimination itself, and not its effects, that makes up the transactional interest. Id.; see Kushner, supra note 126, at 379-82 (observing that finding of transactional
interest will always result in denial of exemption).
130. Swanner, 874 P.2d at 283. The dissent, however, refuted the notion that every
form of discrimination is equally invidious. Id. at 287 (Moore, C.J., dissenting). Chief
Justice Moore noted that while a compelling state interest had been found in the prohibition
of some forms of discrimination, namely racial and gender discrimination, and that such
interests would outweigh a landlord's free exercise rights if the two were in conflict, the
prevention of every form of discrimination would not necessarily outweigh fundamental
constitutional rights. Id. (Moore, C.J., dissenting).
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on what it called "irrelevant characteristics. "'3' Thus, the government had the
same interest in ending marital status discrimination as it did in ending race

or gender discrimination.
Once the court defines the nature of the government interest, it must
determine whether that interest is compelling. When the state's interest is the
eradication of marital status discrimination, the determination requires an
evaluation of several factors.' 32 Outside the housing context, unmarried
couples receive little state protection and, in some cases, suffer from outright
state bias. 33 In Smith, the court examined the many instances in which state
courts have refused to grant unmarried couples the same benefits allowed
married couples."'4 This bias occurs in a variety of situations, such as the
denial of a cause of action for consortium and the denial of spousal support.'35

131. Id. at 283. The dissent in Swanner raised the question of who is to determine what
is an "irrelevant characteristic." Id. at 286 (Moore, C.J., dissenting). In his dissent, Chief
Justice Moore argued that the discrimination at issue was not based on "characteristics," but
on conduct. Id. at 286-87 (Moore, C.J., dissenting). He challenged the elevation of the
prevention of marital status discrimination to such a level that it may justifiably burden the
landlord's constitutional right to free exercise. Id. at 287 (Moore, C.J., dissenting). Chief
Justice Moore supported this contention by comparing this interest with the state interest in
prohibiting other types of discrimination, such as race or gender discrimination, and the
analysis undertaken to justify the compelling nature of these interests. Id. at 287-88 (Moore,
C.J., dissenting). Nothing was shown by the majority, Chief Justice Moore noted, to support
the suggestion that marital status discrimination outweighed the constitutional right of free
exercise of religion. Id. at 289 (Moore, C.J., dissenting).
132. See infra notes 133-50 (examining whether elimination of marital status discrimination is compelling state interest).
133. See Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 395, 404-06
(Ct. App.) (discussing ways in which law leaves unmarried couples unprotected), review
granted, 880 P.2d 111 (Cal. 1994); Donahue v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 2 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 32, 44-45 (Ct. App. 1991) (same), review granted, 825 P.2d 766 (Cal. 1992),
review dismissed and cause remanded, 859 P.2d 671 (Cal. 1993); Attorney Gen. v. Desilets,
636 N.E.2d 233, 239-40 & nn.10-11 (Mass. 1994) (same).
134. Smith, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 404-05.
135. Id. at 405. According to Smith, the state denies unmarried couples the rights
guaranteed married couples in the following situations: the right to a cause of action for
negligent infliction of emotional distress and loss of consortium, Elden v. Sheldon, 250 Cal.
Rptr. 254 (1988); conjugal visits within prisons, In re Cummings, 180 Cal. Rptr. 826 (1982);
spousal support absent written agreement, Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976); joint
umbrella insurance policy, Beaty v. Truck Ins. Exch., 8 Cal. Rptr. 2d 593 (Ct. App. 1992);
and the marital communication privilege under the rules of evidence, People v. Delph, 156
Cal. Rptr. 422 (Ct. App. 1979); see also Donahue, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 44 (listing judicially
enfbrced discrimination against unmarried couples); Desilets, 636 N.E.2d at 239-40 & nn.1011 (discussing statutory and judicial examples of law granting married couples protections that
were denied unmarried cohabitants).

SHOULD FREE EXERCISE PROTECTLANDLORD BIAS?
The Smith court stated that if the state's interest in eradicating discrimination
against unmarried couples was in fact compelling, the legislature would have
reacted to the judicial decisions distinguishing unmarried couples from
married couples by extending protection to unmarried cohabitants, which it
had failed to do.'
As such, the Smith court found that because the state
refused to treat unmarried cohabitants in the same manner as married couples

in contexts other than housing, the state had no compelling interest in preventing marital status discrimination in the housing context. 37
According to Smith, the legislative history of the California antidiscrimination statute provides additional support for a free exercise exemption.13 The legislative history suggests that the legislature added the term
"marital status" to the list of protected classes in the discrimination statute to
protect singles, students, widows, divorced people, and singles with children
not unmarried cohabitants.' 39 Although recognizing that the California
courts have interpreted marital status protections to extend to unmarried
cohabitants, the court found that unmarried couples are entitled to a lower

level of protection than those whom the legislature originally intended the
statute to protect. 14

The Donahue court ruled in a like manner.' 4' The court

136. See Smith, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 405 (finding legislature's lack of response to judicial
decisions reflective of state's interest in marriage).
137. Id. at 406. Some courts also have found fornication statutes to be indicative of a
lack of interest by the state in protecting unmarried cohabitants. For example, in State by
Cooper v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2 (Minn. 1990), the court questioned the logic of finding a
compelling state interest in "promoting fornication" when a state statute prohibits fornication.
Id. at 10. However, as the dissent pointed out, in order to make such an argument the court
must make the assumption that unmarried cohabitants are in fact committing fornication. Id.
at 18-19 (Popovich, C.J., dissenting). The court in Desilets made brief mention of the state
statute criminalizing fornication, the constitutionality of which the court questioned, but did
find that the statute weakened the case for a compelling state interest in eliminating marital
status discrimination. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d at 240. Also, some states still retain statutes
prohibiting cohabitation. See Smith, supra note 32, at 1059 n.29 (discussing states that
criminalize cohabitation). It is difficult to imagine that in these states the interest in protecting unmarried couples from housing discrimination is a compelling one, so long as the
cohabitation statutes are on the books.
138. Smith v. Commission of Fair Employment & Hous., 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 395, 405 (Ct.
App.), review granted, 880 P.2d 111 (Cal. 1994).
139. Id. Those seeking a narrow interpretation of the term "marital status" in those cases
in which the definition of the term was at issue also advanced this argument. See supra notes
47-66 and accompanying text (discussing narrow interpretation of marital status).
140. Smith, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 405. The Smith court was careful to note that the state's
compelling interest in the support of marriage was not an indication of hostility towards other
lifestyles. Id. at 405 n.10.
141. Donahue v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 32, 45 (Ct. App.
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examined California's treatment of unmarried couples in other contexts and
found many examples of state disfavor of unmarried cohabitants. 42 The
Donahue court also noted that the California legislature has exempted public
and private postsecondary schools from the provisions against marital status
discrimination to allow schools to restrict married-student housing to married
students only. 43 Although the court noted the increasing trend of cohabitation
outside of marriage, it nonetheless reaffirmed the importance of marriage to
society and the strong public policy favoring marriage.'"
Finally, the courts that did not find a compelling state interest looked to
the effects of granting a free exercise exemption on the availability of housing
to unmarried couples.' 45 In both Smith and Donahue, the courts noted that a
free exercise exemption only precluded a lim*ited number of rental units.'4 In
Donahue, the court found that there was no state interest in providing a specific
rental unit to an unmarried couple, so long as other decent, sanitary, safe, and
not overcrowded housing was available. 47 Similarly, the Smith court noted
that no evidence existed that granting an exemption to a specific landlord
would cause a serious housing shortage or that other landlords increasingly
would seek religious exemptions. 148 The court also found that the unmarried
couple who originally brought the complaint suffered no real burden as a result
of the discrimination. 49 They lived together without incident for five years
prior to seeking the particular unit in question and presented no evidence of
any difficulty in finding housing following the challenged denial."i°
1991), review granted, 825 P.2d 766 (Cal. 1992), review dismissed and cause remanded, 859
P.2d 671 (Cal. 1993).
142. Id. at 44-45. The Donahue court noted disparate treatment between married and
unmarried couples in such diverse areas as overnight prison visits and the standing of surviving
partners to sue on wrongful death claims. Id. at 44.
143. Id. at 44-45 (citing CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12995 (West 1988)).
144. Id. at 45.
145. See Smith v. Commission of Fair Employment & Ious., 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 395, 407
(Ct. App.) (stating that case at hand "does not raise the spectre of floodgates opened to a myriad
of exemptions from the state anti-discrimination law"), review granted, 880 P.2d 111 (Cal.
1994); Donahue, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 45 (noting that particular case of discrimination does not
make all housing unavailable).
146. Smith, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 407; Donahue v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 2
Cal. Rptr. 2d 32, 45 (Ct. App. 1991), review granted, 825 P.2d 766 (Cal. 1992), review
dismissed and cause remanded, 859 P.2d 671 (Cal. 1993).
147. Donahue, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 45.
148. Smith, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 407.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 407-08. The court went so far as to state that "in light of dominant
community mores, it is entirely likely complainants could live together unmarried for the rest

SHOULD FREE EXERCISE PROTECTLANDLORD BIAS?
The Swanner court, however, found a dual state interest in the antidiscrimination statute - ensuring access to housing for all people and preventing
discrimination based on "irrelevant characteristics."- 1 Thus, the determination
of whether the state's interest was compelling required a different analysis than
utilized for a more narrowly characterized state interest.'52 The Swanner court
recognized that alternative housing would satisfy the state's derivative interest
in providing housing for all people.1 53 However, the court found that the
state's transactional interest in eliminating discrimination per se would suffer

impermissibly if it were to grant an exemption. s" With this characterization,
the court appears to have predetermined the outcome of the analysis. 5 The
transactional interest relieves the government of the need to substantiate the
interest with evidentiary support.'56 Thus, with the finding of a transactional
interest, it appears that the analysis is complete. The Swanner court, however,
went on to distinguish the many examples of judicial and legislative bias
against unmarried couples by limiting the interest in eliminating discrimination
to the housing context. "5 In this way, the court did not reach the issue of the
lack of protection given unmarried couples in other areas of the law.5 I
of their lives and never again confront discrimination because of their unmarried status." Id.
at 408.
151. Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274, 282 (Alaska), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 460 (1994); see supra notes 126-31 and accompanying text (discussing
state interest characterization in Swanner).
152. See supranotes 133-50 (examining analysis of whether eradication of discrimination
based on marital status is compelling interest).
153. See Swanner, 874 P.2d at 282 (recognizing that alternative housing would satisfy
state's derivative interest).
154. Id. at 282-83.
155. See id. at 287 (Moore, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that majority "engages in a game
where the 'transactional' or 'derivative' label attached to any given state interest predetermines the outcome of the case"); Kushner, supra note 126, at 382-85 (discussing Chief Justice
Moore's dissent). According to Kushner, the finding of a transactional interest is fatal to a
free exercise claimant. Id. at 384.
156. See Kushner, supra note 126, at 390 (recognizing that transactional interest
creates uneven playing field by allowing government to dispense with need for evidentiary
support).
157. Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274, 283 (Alaska), cert.
denied, 115 S. Ct. 460 (1994).
158. Id.; see Donahue v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 32, 44
(Ct. App. 1991) (reviewing other contexts in which unmarried couples remain unprotected
from discrimination), review granted, 825 P.2d 766 (Cal. 1992), review dismissed and cause
remanded, 859 P.2d 671 (Cal. 1993). The Swanner court examined the examples of different
treatment for married and unmarried couples set forth by the dissent and found the disparate
treatment necessary to prevent the fraudulent use of benefits available only to spouses.
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Thus, the application of a religious exercise exemption to an antidis-

crimination statute relies most heavily on the interpretation of the state
interest advanced by the statute.1 9

When the interest is limited to the

elimination of discrimination against unmarried couples, the determination
of whether the interest is compelling depends on the perceived importance

of protecting unmarried couples (as compared to other classes), the treatment
of unmarried couples in areas of the law outside housing law, and the effect

of exempting a landlord from the antidiscrimination statute on the availability
of housing to unmarried couples."W However, when the court broadly
characterizes the interest as the elimination of discrimination per se, the

interest appears compelling by its nature.' 6
Following a determination of the state's interest, the court must balance
this interest against the burden placed on the landlord's religious exercise. 62
This is a relatively mechanical procedure, as the definition of the burden and
Swanner, 874 P.2d at 283. According to the court, this problem was not present in the
housing context. Id. However, this analysis did not appear to answer the underlying question
posed by the disparate treatment of unmarried couples in the law: Why are certain benefits
only available to spouses and not unmarried partners?
159. This is assuming that the court is applying a compelling state interest balancing test,
either in reliance on state constitutional provisions or an application of RFRA in the context
of federal constitutional protections.
160. See supra notes 133-50 and accompanying text (discussing methods used by courts
to determine whether protection of iinmarried couples is compelling state interest).
161. See supra notes 151-58 (examining Swanner court's discussion of transactional
interest in eliminating discrimination per se).
162. The courts have split over the weight of this interest when balanced against the burden placed on religious exercise. The Supreme Court recently denied the petition for a writ
of certiorari in Swanner. Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 115 S. Ct. 460
(1994). In a dissent to the denial, Justice Thomas argued for the opportunity to determine
whether the elimination of marital status discrimination was sufficiently compelling to allow
the antidiscrimination statute to burden religious exercise. Id. at 460-61 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas, questioning the Alaska Supreme Court's determination of the
compelling nature of the state interest, contrasted the court's analysis with the stringent examination undertaken in Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983). Id. at 461
(Thomas, J., dissenting). In Bob Jones Univ., the Court found a compelling interest in the
elimination of racial discrimination only after finding numerous pronouncements of the Court
coupled with a number of legislative and judicial actions that demonstrated a "firm national
policy to prohibit racial segregation and discrimination in public education." Id. at 461
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 593
(1983)). Justice Thomas, noting the lack of any national policy against marital status discrimination and the discrimination conducted by the State of Alaska against unmarried couples in
other contexts, claimed that the decision of the Alaska Supreme Court "drains the word
compelling of any meaning and seriously undermines the protection for exercise of religion
that Congress so emphatically mandated in RFRA." Id. at 462 (Thomas, J., dissenting).

SHOULD FREE EXERCISE PROTECTLANDLORD BIAS?
the nature of the state interest involved are the determinative factors of the
free exercise analysis in this situation. For example, the Donahue court
found no compelling state interest sufficient to override the landlord's free
exercise rights and thus created a religious exercise exemption from the antidiscrimination statute. 63 Alternatively, the court in Swanner found that the
state interest in protecting unmarried couples from housing discrimination
outweighed the rights of the landlords to exercise their religious beliefs. 6 4
Thus, the court did not grant the landlords an exemption from the housing
antidiscrimination laws. 6
D. Least Restrictive Means
The final step in a free exercise analysis involves determining whether
there is an alternative that would allow the state to advance its interests in a
way less restrictive of the landlord's religious exercise." 6 Because of the
lack of a compelling staie interest in Smith and Donahue, this determination
was unnecessary. 67 The Swanner court did not explore the possibility of a
less restrictive alternative.' 68 Arguably, a less restrictive means, if in fact
a court considered the state interest compelling, would be to allow free
exercise exemptions from the statute. 6 9
V. ReligiousExercise as a Landlord Defense
in Other DiscriminationContexts
Significantly, the religious exercise exemption analysis as applied to
landlords who discriminate against unmarried couples may provide an illustrative backdrop for the examination of other types of landlord-tenant conflicts. A very similar situation is the refusal of a landlord to rent to a
163. Donahue v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 32, 46 (Ct. App.
1991), review granted, 825 P.2d 766 (Cal. 1992), review dismissed and cause remanded, 859
P.2d 671 (Cal. 1993).
164. Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274, 284 (Alaska), cert.

denied, 115 S. Ct. 460 (1994).
165. Id.
166. See Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707,718 (1981) (allowing burden of religious
exercise only when achieved by "least restrictive means").
167. Smith v. Commission of Fair Employment & Hous., 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 395, 405,
409-10 (Ct. App.), review granted, 880 P.2d 111 (Cal. 1994); Donahue, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at

44.
168. See generally Swanner, 874 P.2d at 280-84 (declining to examine less restrictive
alternatives).
169. See Duncan, supra note 18, at 438 (recognizing that antidiscrimination statutes are
not least restrictive means to advance state interest).
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homosexual or lesbian couple on the basis of the landlord's religious belief

that facilitating such relationships is a sin."0 Further questions arise con-

cerning other conduct that landlords might believe is sinful to facilitate, such

as alcohol or drug use or even religious practices contrary to the landlord's
own practice. 7 ' Before a free exercise analysis is necessary, the landlord

must have in fact violated a housing discrimination statute.172 Outside the
classes protected by federal, state, and local antidiscrimination statutes,
landlords are free to discriminate against whomever they choose. 73 How-

170. It is likely that homosexual individuals would receive protection under sexual
orientation provisions contained in antidiscrimination statutes if available within the jurisdiction.
Homosexual couples also might attempt to advance an argument for marital status protection as
well. See infra notes 187-88 and accompanying text (discussing applicability of marital status
protection to homosexual couples).
171. See CARTER, supra note 1, at 136-37 (discussing conflict between landlord and
Satanist). Professor Carter poses the hypothetical situation in which a religious landlord is
forced to chose between renting to an avowed Satanist who intends to conduct satanic rituals
while occupying the apartment and refusing to rent on religious grounds and suffering sanctions
for violating the state antidiscrimination law. Id. at 136-37. Carter notes the existence of a
third alternative available to a landlord in such a delicate situation, the withdrawal of the unit
from the market, with the subsequent loss of income normally generated by the unit. Id.; see
supra notes 111-13 and accompanying text (characterizing burden placed on landlord as selfinduced). While this may sound like a wildly exaggerated possibility, the potential for such a
situation, on a more realistic scale, is very real. Although the various possibilities are endless,
the remainder of this Note will focus only on racial and sexual orientation discrimination. On
a related note, the court in Smith v. Commission of Fair Employment & Hous. addressed
whether the denial of housing to an unmarried couple constituted an attempt by the landlord to
require her tenants to adhere to certain religious tenets. Smith, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 406 n. 13.
The court stated that the landlord's own belief does not involve the "imposition of beliefs upon
others." Id.
172. See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text (discussing need for violation of
antidiscrimination statute before exemption is necessary). Federal law prohibits landlords from
discriminating on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, sex, disability, and familial
status. Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1988 & Supp. V 1993); see supra
note 32 (discussing interpretation of familial status). In addition, state and local jurisdictions
have in some cases extended additional protections to classes distinguished by income or welfare
status, marital status, age, sexual orientation, matriculation, and even political affiliation. See
D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2515 (1992) (prohibiting discrimination based on "race, color, religion,
national origin, sex, age, marital status, personal appearance, sexual orientation, family
responsibilities, physical handicap, matriculation, political affiliation, source of income, or place
of residence or business").
173. See Duncan, supra note 18, at 400 (recognizing that civil rights laws are "nothing
more than exceptions to the general rule of free choice"). Thus, so long as a prospective tenant
is not a member of a protected class or is a member, but the landlord did not refuse on the basis
of membership in that class, the landlord has not violated the law, regardless of how silly or
unfair that refusal might be. See also SCHwEMM, supra note 32, at 377-82 (discussing classes
left unprotected by federal fair housing legislation, but offered state or local protection in some
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ever, if a landlord discriminates against a protected class for religious

reasons and thus violates a discrimination statute, the court should apply the
same analysis as discussed in Part IV. 174
Consider a landlord who discriminates against an interracial couple as

a result of a sincerely held religious belief and claims that the facilitation of
such activity is sinful."5 The landlord could argue that state compulsion to

allow such activity would substantially burden her free exercise of religion. 176 Before a court grants an exemption, however, it must examine the
state interest behind the statute and balance this interest against the burden

placed on the landlord's religious exercise.'" In this situation, such an
analysis is not very difficult because the compelling nature of the state
interest in eliminating racial discrimination is well-settled and supported by
legislation, executive action, and Supreme Court precedent. 178 This scenario
jurisdictions); Kushner, supra note 32, at 1104-10 (noting discrimination against groups that
currently remain unprotected).
174. See supra notes 72-169 and accompanying text (discussing application of traditional
strict scrutiny test, which allows burdening of free exercise supported by sincerely held religious
belief only when state can demonstrate compelling interest).
175. One prerequisite for the application of a free exercise exemption requires an examination of the sincerity of the religious belief held by a landlord. See supra notes 83-89 and
accompanying text (discussing determination by court of sincerity of religious belief). This step
is necessary to prevent landlords from discriminating and then asserting religious freedom as
a shield from liability. See Donahue v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d
32, 42 n.12 (Ct. App. 1991) (recognizing possibility of bogus assertions of religious belief),
review granted, 825 P.2d 766 (Cal. 1992), review granted and cause remanded, 859 P.2d 671
(Cal. 1993). A more difficult question may arise in determining whether the belief is in fact
religious. As the diversity of religious beliefs in this country continues to expand, defining
religion grows more and more difficult. See supra note 88 and accompanying text (discussing
different interpretations of religion and relatively few Supreme Court discussions of issue); see
also Gey, supra note 88, at 152 (noting complications of defining religion as result of
"increasingly pluralistic ethnic and religious character of the population," as well as expansion
of government into "virtually every form of human activity").
176. It would appear that a free exercise exemption would implicate both the state constitution and the federal constitution, with each potentially requiring a strict scrutiny-compelling
state interest analysis. See supra notes 8-28 and accompanying text (discussing protection
offered by federal constitution and increased reliance on protection state constitutions offer).
It is important to note that the strict scrutiny-compelling state interest test is not the only test that
courts have applied to free exercise claims. See supra notes 19-28 and accompanying text
(discussing proper test for federal protection following Employment Div. v. Smith and enactment of RFRA, as well as tests applied by some state courts in interpreting state constitutional
protections).
177. See supra notes 115-65 and accompanying text (discussing statute's advancement of
marital-status protection to determine whether statute's purpose is compelling).
178. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (1988) (making it unlawful to refuse to rent or sell on
basis of race); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (finding statute criminalizing inter-

382

53 WASH. &LEE L. REV. 351 (1996)

is similar to the situation in Bob Jones University v. United States. 7 In Bob

Jones University, the Internal Revenue Service revoked the tax-exempt status
of a Christian school as a result of the school's prohibition on interracial
dating and marriage."8 Although recognizing that the denial of tax-exempt
status would burden the college's religious exercise, the United States Supreme Court found the compelling state interest in eradicating racial discrimination in education sufficient to override the college's religious exercise
claim.'
Thus, in our hypothetical the court would not grant a religious
exercise exemption to the antidiscrimination statute.
A more difficult situation arises when a landlord's religious beliefs
dictate discrimination against homosexual and lesbian couples. Unlike race
or gender, society has widely divergent attitudes towards nontraditional
lifestyles. The nature of the state interest in prohibiting discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation remains poorly defined. "' Although the Fair
Housing Act does not prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation,"
racial marriage unconstitutional as violation of Equal Protection Clause); Brown v. Board of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (finding segregation of public schools on basis of race violation of Equal Protection Clause); Exec. Order No. 9988, 3 C.F.R. 726, 729 (1943-1948)
(prohibiting racial discrimination in classifications for Selective Service); see also Roberts v.
United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623-26 (1984) (discussing compelling interest of state in
prohibiting gender discrimination).
179. 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
180. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 580-81 (1983).
181. Id. at 602-04.
182. See, e.g., Patricia A. Cain, Litigatingfor Lesbian and Gay Rights: A Legal History,
79 VA. L. REV. 1551 (1993) (noting lack of prominence of gay rights cases among discussions
of legal scholars); Developments in the Law - Sexual Orientation and the Law, 102 HARV. L.
REv. 1508, 1511 (1989) [hereinafter Developments] (noting "[siharply conflicting" views toward
homosexuals "reflected in legislation, legal decisionmaking, and legal scholarship"). See
generally Rhonda R. Rivera, Our Straight-LacedJudges: The Legal Position of Homosexuals
in the United States, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 799 (1979) (discussing law's unequal treatment of
homosexuals).
183. Several attempts have been made to expand the Fair Housing Act to include homosexuals within its scope. See, e.g., H.R. 1430, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3 (1991) (prohibiting
discrimination in housing, employment, or public accommodations on basis of sexual
orientation), reprintedin 137 CONG. REc. H1728-29 (daily ed. Mar. 13, 1991); S. 47, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 7-8 (1989) (same), reprintedin 135 CONG. REC. S340-41 (daily ed. Jan.
25, 1989). While not extending protection to homosexuals, the Fair Housing Amendments Act
of 1988, with its inclusion of the disabled, protects those afflicted with Acquired Immune
Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS). 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Thus, under
federal law, landlords can discriminate against homosexuals based on a fear of AIDS, but if the
prospective tenant actually has AIDS, the landlord violates the antidiscrimination statute if he
refuses the applicant on that basis. See Kushner, supra note 32, at 1108 (noting lack of protection provided homosexuals, but recognizing inclusion of AIDS victims in federal housing discrimination statute).
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states and localities increasingly are providing protection for homosexuals and

lesbians." 4 At the same time, however, the extension of antidiscrimination
laws to same-sex couples is not without controversy.' 5 For example, in
Colorado, voters recently passed an amendment to the state constitution that
repealed existing laws against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation
and prohibited future laws providing these protections.", Without a prohibi184. There is a growing number of states and localities that have enacted laws prohibiting
discrimination in some contexts on the basis of sexual orientation. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 51.7
(West Supp. 1996); CAL. LAB. CODE § 1102.1 (West Supp. 1996); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 46a-81a to -81r (West 1995); HAw. REV. STAT. §§ 378-1 to 378-2 (Supp. 1992); MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 151B, §§ 3-4 (West 1996); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 363.03 (West Supp. 1996);
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:5-5, 10:5-12 (West 1993 & Supp. 1995); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 143
(Supp. 1995); id. tit.9, §§ 4503-4504 (1993); id. tit. 21, § 495 (Supp. 1995); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§§ 101.22, 111.32 (West 1988 & Supp. 1995). Of the listed states, neither California nor
Hawaii statutorily protects homosexuals from discrimination in housing. However, not all
protections are statutory. For example, in California, the courts expanded the scope of state
civil rights legislation to prohibit housing discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. See
Hubert v. Williams, 184 Cal. Rptr. 161, 163 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1982) (finding that Unruh
Civil Rights Act protects homosexuals seeking to rent); see also Thomas Weathers, Comment,
Gay Civil Rights: Are Homosexuals Adequately Protectedfrom Discriminationin Housing and
Employment?, 24 PAC. L.J. 541, 546-52 (1993) (discussing line of precedent that extended
protection to homosexuals in rental housing). In addition, many municipalities, including
Anchorage, Atlanta, Baltimore, the District ofColumbia, and Los Angeles have enacted some
form of gay rights protections. Cf. HAYDEN CURRY ET AL., A LEGAL GUIDE FOR LESBIAN AND
GAY COUPLES 2-3 (8th ed. 1994) (listing some protections provided to homosexuals); McCabe,
supra note 25, at 76-77 (recognizing problem that arises when state and municipality actions that
ban discrimination on basis of lifestyle conflict with landlord's religious beliefs); Note,
ConstitutionalLimits on Anti-Gay-Rights Initiatives, 106 HARV. L. REv. 1905, 1923-25 (1983)
[hereinafter Note, Anti-Gay-Rights Initiatives] (listing state and local gay rights laws). Despite
the expansion of antidiscrimination laws, there is continued support in the legal community for
further extension of the scope and coverage of protections offered homosexuals. See Kushner,
supra note 32, at 1108-09 (promoting "informed legislative protection" to counter widespread
"homophobia and sexual preference discrimination"); Developments, supra note 182, at 1671
(recognizing that "piecemeal coverage" provided by local legislation is insufficient to
consistently protect gays and lesbians).
185. See Note, Anti-Gay-Rights Initiatives, supra note 184, at 1907-09 (discussing struggle
over gay rights laws).
186. See COLO. CONST. art. HI,§ 30b. In pertinent part, the amendment reads "Neither
the State of Colorado, . . . nor any of its agencies, political subdivisions, [or] municipalities . . . shall enact, adopt or enforce any statute . . . whereby homosexual . . .
orientation, conduct, practices or relationships shall constitute or otherwise be the basis
of... [a] claim of discrimination." However, this amendment was challenged in state court
as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. See Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1286
(Colo.) (affirming grant of preliminary injunction to prevent enforcement of Amendment
Two, which infringed on fundamental right to participate in political process), cert. denied,
114 S. Ct. 419 (1993). The Colorado Supreme Court found that the amendment infringed
on homosexuals' rights to participate in the political process, a fundamental right; thus, the
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tion of sexual orientation discrimination, the analysis need proceed no further.
Let us assume, for purposes of analysis, that a given rental unit is in a
jurisdiction that prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and
that the landlord has violated this statute by refusing to rent to a homosexual
couple. This couple might claim discrimination based on either marital status
or sexual orientation. " Marital status discrimination against homosexual
couples is in a sense more troubling than discrimination against heterosexual
couples because heterosexual couples can always end such discrimination by
choosing to marry, while same-sex marriages are prohibited by law.", Because this Note has already addressed the conflict between religious exercise
and marital status discrimination, this analysis will focus on the couple's claim
of sexual orientation discrimination. 189
amendment was subject to strict scrutiny. Id. at 1276, 1285. The court, following further
proceedings by the lower court, found no compelling state interest and upheld a permanent
injunction enjoining enforcement of the amendment. See Evans v. Romer, 882 P.2d 1335,
1350 (Colo. 1994) (finding amendment not narrowly tailored to serve any compelling
government interest, not severable, and not valid exercise of state power under Tenth
Amendment), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 1092 (1995).
187. Assuming also that the jurisdiction prohibits discrimination based on marital status.
See Beattie, supra note 37, at 1449 (questioning whether statutes prohibiting marital status
discrimination protect lesbian and gay couples); Stacey L. Boyle, Note, Marital Status
Classifications:ProtectingHomosexual and Heterosexual Cohabitors, 14 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 111, 135 (1986) (recognizing emerging issue of whether persons "who are homosexuals
or cohabitors, or both" should receive increased legal protection); Neuman, supra note 47,
at 996-97 (noting difficulty in determining whether discrimination against gay couples is
based on marital status, sexual orientation, or both); Developments, supra note 182, at 1604,
1616 (recognizing limited protection provided gay and lesbian couples by marital status
antidiscrimination statutes); see also Zahorian v. Russell Fitt Real Estate Agency, 301 A.2d
754, 757 (N.J. 1973) (finding that prohibitions against marital status discrimination protected
two unmarried females denied housing on basis of sex and marital status). But see
Evangelista Assocs. v. Bland, 458 N.Y.S.2d 996, 997 (Civ. Ct. 1983) (finding that cohabitation by two adult males was not entitled to marital status protection, but could be considered
discrimination on basis of sexual orientation).
188. See Beattie, supra note 37, at 1428 (recognizing distinction between marital status
and race, sex, and disability, as marital status can change "with relative ease"); Developments, supranote 182, at 1604 (recognizing inherent unfairness faced by homosexual couples
and arguing for either right to marry or right to benefits denied as result of their unmarried
status). There is a great amount of academic literature discussing same-sex marriage. See
generally Developments, supra note 182, at 1605-11; Adrienne K. Wilson, Note, Same-Sex
Marriage:A Review, 17 WM. MrrcHELL L. REV. 539 (1991); Lisa R. Zimmer, Note, Family,
Marriage,and the Same-Sex Couple, 12 CAROZO L. Rv. 681 (1990).
189. See supra notes 83-169 and accompanying text (discussing applicability of free
exercise exemption when landlord discriminates on basis of marital status). Arguably, discrimination against an individual might constitute discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, while discrimination against a homosexual couple could constitute discrimination based
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Following a finding of discrimination, the next step is to determine
whether the landlord has a sincerely held religious belief that requires her to
violate the antidiscrimination statute."9° This test mirrors the determination
laid out in the marital status cases. 9' So long as the belief is sincere and the
on sexual orientation, conduct, or both. However, a landlord could seek a religious exemption
whether he discriminates on the basis of either orientation or conduct. See State by Cooper v.
French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 4 (Minn. 1990) (recognizing landlord's belief that, despite lack of
evidence showing intent of unmarried couple to have sexual relations, living together constituted
"appearance of evil" and conflicted with his religious beliefs). In French, the court noted that
past precedent did not require direct evidence of fornication and recognized a "clear inference
of sexual relations between cohabiting couples." Id. at 5 (quoting State ex rel. McClure v.
Sports & Health Club, Inc., 370 N.W.2d 844, 849-50 (Minn. 1985)). The dissent in French
rejected the majority's finding in part because there was no evidence of fornication and the
presumption of conduct drawn from appearances was pure conjecture. Id. at 18 (Popovich,
C.J., dissenting). But cf Attorney Gen. v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233, 235 (Mass. 1994)
(refuting landlord's argument that discrimination was based on conduct, not marital status). In
Desilets, the court focused on the nature of the discrimination by examining the way in which
the landlord would treat a married couple living together in a sexual relationship and an
unmarried couple living together in a sexual relationship and found that the controlling
difference between the couples was their marital status. Id. at 235. Either argument could be
applied to a homosexual couple. A landlord might discriminate by presuming that homosexual
conduct would occur. See Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 464 (7th Cir. 1989) (finding
declaration of soldier barred from re-enlistment that she was lesbian "reliable evidence of a
desire and propensity to engage in homosexual conduct"), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1004 (1990).
In Ben-Shalom, the court examined whether the application of an army regulation that
disqualified admitted homosexuals despite lack of evidence of homosexual acts was a violation
of the plaintiff's equal protection rights. Id. at 456-57. The court found that the statute's
classification was not merely on the basis of status, but on "reasonable inferences about her
probable conduct in the past and in the future." Id. at 464; see also Cain, supra note 182, at
1621-27 (noting potential success of distinguishing between status and conduct as possible
advantage in equal protection cases against the military, but recognizing lack of success beyond
military cases because judges appear to assume all homosexuals engage in homosexual sodomy).
On the other hand, a landlord may discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation, without
presuming homosexual conduct would take place, perhaps under an appearance-of-evil argument, as suggested in French. French, 460 N.W.2d at 4. In either case, so long as a sincerely
held religious belief necessitated the discrimination, the first requirement for a free exercise
exemption would be met. However, the distinction between status and conduct discrimination
may be relevant to a determination of the compelling state interest. See infra notes 198-235
(examining whether state interest in eliminating sexual orientation discrimination is compelling).
190. See supranotes 83-89 and accompanying text (discussing necessity of sincerely held
religious belief as prerequisite in free exercise analysis).
191. See supra notes 83-89 and accompanying text (discussing requirement of sincerely
held religious belief before court considers exemption to antidiscrimination statute). Note
also the difficulty in defining religious exercise for the purposes of the free exercise clause.
See supra note 84 and accompanying text (discussing various interpretations of "religion" in
free exercise claim and importance of court remaining vigilant to deny use of religious
exercise only as subterfuge to discriminate free from liability); see also Smith v. Commission
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basis for the belief is "religious," the prerequisites for a free exercise exemption are met.
Before a court will allow an exemption, the landlord must show that the
enforcement of the statute substantially burdens her religious exercise.'92
The same considerations involved in the unmarried couples context temper
this analysis.' 9 3 Thus, a court might interpret religious exercise broadly to

encompass not only religious ceremony, but also religiously motivated daily
activity, such as apartment rental. 194Alternatively, a court might interpret
religious exercise narrowly, particularly because of the commercial nature
of the conflict, and find no burden or a burden self-imposed by the landlord.'95 However, the weight of past precedent favors a finding that the

enforcement of the antidiscrimination statute would substantially burden the
landlord's right to free exercise. 91 6 Thus, as in the case of discrimination
against unmarried couples, the determination of whether a court should grant
a free exercise exemption to a landlord discriminating against a same-sex
couple based on a sincerely held religious belief turns on whether the state
can demonstrate the existence of a compelling interest that outweighs the
burden on the landlord. Again, the court first must determine the state
interest7 involved, and then it must determine whether that interest is compel-

ling.

19

of Fair Employment & Hous., 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 395, 399 n.4 (Ct. App.) (discussing claims
"so bizarre" and "so clearly non-religious" as not to be entitled to free exercise protection),
review granted, 880 P.2d 111 (Cal. 1994).
192. See supra notes 90-114 and accompanying test (discussing burden placed on landlord's free exercise rights by enforcement of statutory marital status protection).
193. See supra notes 90-114 and accompanying text (considering factors such as
commercial context of discrimination and alternatives available to landlord when facing threat
of prosecution).
194. See supra notes 92-106 and accompanying text (examining broad interpretation of
religious exercise, as applied in Desilets, Smith, and Donahue decisions).
195. See supra notes 107-13 and accompanying text (examining narrow interpretation
of religious exercise).
196. See Smith v. Commission of Fair Employment & Hous., 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 395, 406
(Ct. App.) (finding religious exercise rights of landlord substantially burdened), review
granted, 880 P.2d 111 (Cal. 1994); Donahue v. Fair Employment & -ous. Comm'n., 2 Cal.
Rptr. 2d. 32, 43 (Ct. App. 1991) (same), review granted, 825 P.2d 766 (Cal. 1992), review
dismissed and cause remanded, 859 P.2d 671 (Cal. 1993); Attorney Gen. v. Desilets, 636
N.E.2d 233, 238 (Mass. 1994) (finding enforcement of antidiscrimination statute substantially
burdened landlord's religious exercise). But see Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights
Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274, 283 (Alaska) (finding what little burden borne by landlord was selfimposed), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 460 (1994).
197. See supra notes 118-31 and accompanying text (discussing importance of court's
characterization of state interest in subsequent analysis of interest's compelling nature).
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As in the context of unmarried couples, the characterization of the state
interest behind the antidiscrimination statute controls the determination of the

interest's compelling nature.' 98 The possible interests parallel those defined
by the courts for antidiscrimination statutes prohibiting marital status discrimination."9 For example, the court could follow the lead of Smith,
Donahue, and Desilets and limit the state interest to the prohibition of dis-

crimination against same-sex couples.'
Alternatively, the court could
broadly characterize the interest to encompass the eradication of discrimination per se, similar to the transactional interest in Swanner.20'
Gay Rights Coalition v. Georgetown University) provides insight into
some of the factors examined when determining the state's interest in elim-

inating sexual orientation discrimination and whether that interest is compelling.2"'

In Gay Rights Coalition, the Court of Appeals for the District of

198. See supra notes 118-31 and accompanying text (recognizing importance of
characterization of state interest to determination of compelling nature of interest).
199. But cf. Markey, supra note 2, at 788-89 (recognizing possibility of variety of
different government interests in marital status context).
200. See Smith, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d. at 406 (finding religious exercise rights of landlord
substantially burdened); Donahue, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d. at 43 (same); Desilets, 636 N.E.2d at 238
(finding enforcement of antidiscrimination statute substantially burdened landlord's religious
exercise); see also supra notes 118-25 and accompanying text (discussing narrow characterization of state interest).
201. See Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274, 282-83 (Alaska)
(defining transactional interest as prevention of discrimination based on irrelevant characteristics), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 460 (1994). It is possible that the derivative interest, or the
effect of the landlord's activity, would be relevant in the same-sex context because the
availability of alternative housing may be more restricted than in the unmarried couple
context. See id. at 282 (noting that available alternative housing satisfies derivative interest).
202. 536 A.2d 1 (D.C. 1987).
203. Gay Rights Coalition v. Georgetown Univ., 536 A.2d 1, 39 (D.C. 1987) (denying
free exercise exemption to religious university). At issue in Gay Rights Coalition was
Georgetown University's refusal to recognize two student gay-rights groups and the denial
of equal access to university facilities and services to which other recognized student groups
were entitled. Id. at 4-5. The University, founded and operated as a Roman Catholic school,
refused to recognize the two groups because of the conflict between the groups' views and
the teachings of the Roman Catholic Church. Id. at 11-12. The court, construing the statute
to uphold its constitutionality, differentiated between "endorsement" and the tangible benefits
that follow from University recognition. Id. at 20-30. The court found that the Human
Rights Act did not require endorsement, but did require equal access to the tangible benefits.
Id. The court denied Georgetown's attempt to acquire a free exercise exemption. Id. at 3039. As a result of the court's segregation of endorsement from the tangible benefits that are
due student organizations following their recognition by the University, such as the use of a
university mailbox, computer label service, mailing services, and the right to apply for
university funding, the court found only a slight burden on the University's free exercise.
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Columbia examined whether the District's antidiscrimination statute, the

Human Rights Act,' required a private Catholic university to recognize a
homosexual student group. 5 The court found that the District of Columbia
had a compelling interest in eradicating discrimination based on sexual
orientation that outweighed the burden imposed on Georgetown's religious
exercise. 0 Finally, the court determined that the Human Rights Act was the
least restrictive means of eradicating sexual orientation discrimination.'
Therefore, it denied Georgetown a free exercise exemption.2 1'
The Gay Rights Coalition analysis of the state .interest in eradicating

sexual orientation discrimination provides a framework within which to
examine the state's interest in the housing context. First, the court recognized the "strong feelings" of the City Council of the District of Columbia
inenacting the Human Rights Act, but stated that this legislative support was
not determinative because the inquiry was a matter of law to be determined
by the courts. 9 One could assume that any state or municipality that
amended its antidiscrimination statute to include sexual orientation as a
protected class would have a similarly strong interest. 210 Second, the court

found an intent on the part of the Council to consider equally damaging all
Id. at 31.
204. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-2501 to 1-2557 (1992 & Supp. 1995).
205. Gay Rights Coalition, 536 A.2d at 5. The Human Rights Act provides in part:
It is an unlawful discriminatory practice... for an educational institution: (1) To
deny, restrict, or to abridge or condition the use of, or access to, any of its
facilities and services to any person otherwise qualified, wholly or partially, for
a discriminatory reason, based upon the race, color, religion, national origin, sex,
age, marital status, personal appearance, sexual orientation, family responsibilities, political affiliation, source of income, or disability ....
D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2520 (Supp. 1995). The Human Rights Act defines sexual orientation
as "male or female homosexuality, heterosexuality and bisexuality, by preference or
practice." Id. § 1-2502 (1992). The Act prohibits discrimination based on "race, color,
religion, national origin, sex, age, marital status, personal appearance, sexual orientation,
family responsibilities, disability, matriculation, political affiliation, source of income, or
place of residence or business" in real estate transactions, which includes the rental of real
estate. Id. § 1-2515 (Supp. 1995).
206. Gay Rights Coalition, 536 A.2d at 38.
207. Id. at 39.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 33 (noting that "[i]t is emphatically the province of the judicial department
to say what the law is" (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803))).
210. Cf. CURRY ET AL., supra note 184, at 2-2 (recognizing that jurisdictions that pass
antidiscrimination ordinances are often places where homosexuals were accepted before
jurisdictions passed statutes).
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forms of discrimination based on anything other than individual merit. '

This approach placed the eradication of sexual orientation discrimination on
the same level as the eradication of racial discrimination. 2 This characterization of the state interest closely parallels the transactional interest defined
in Swanner.1 3 The Gay Rights Coalition court
determined that sexual
2 14

orientation was not indicative of individual merit.

Because the court defined the state interest in such broad terms, the
state's burden to demonstrate a compelling interest was light.2 1 5 In determining whether the state's interest was compelling, the court examined

the effects of society's bias against homosexuals, as demonstrated by past
and ongoing discrimination.2 16 The Gay Rights Coalition court also found

support for the compelling nature of the District's interest in eliminating
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation by comparing homosexuals
211. Gay Rights Coalition v. Georgetown Univ., 536 A.2d 1, 32 (D.C. 1987). Judge
Belson, in his dissent, questioned the determination that the Council intended all protections
to be given equal weight and expressed doubt that the Council would have as compelling an
interest in the elimination of discrimination on the basis of personal appearance, a class
protected under the Human Rights Act, as in the elimination of discrimination based on race.
Id. at 72 (Belson, J., dissenting). Whether or not this was the case, Judge Belson stated,
public policy, both local and national, did not indicate that the protection of homosexuals and
the protection of racial minorities had reached the same level. Id. (Belson, J., dissenting).
212. See DENNIS ALTMAN, TlE HOMOSEXUALIZATION OF AMERICA, THE AMERICANIZATION OF THE HOMOSEXUAL 9 (1982) (recognizing advantage to homosexuals in redirecting
debate from behavior to identity); Peter M. Cicchino et al., Comment, Sex, Lies and Civil
Rights: A CriticalHistory of the Massachusetts Gay Civil Rights Bill, 26 HARv. C.R.-C.L.
L. REv. 549, 613 (1991) (discussing homosexual rights argument that homosexuals are
similarly situated to racial minorities); see also infra note 231 (discussing argument for
heightened scrutiny for sexual orientation in equal protection cases); cf. Markey, supra note
2, at 790-91 (praising Gay Rights Coalitioncourt's characterization of interest as eliminating
invidious discrimination); Mueller, supra note 47, at 170 (arguing that discrimination against
unmarried couples is similar to discrimination on the basis of race, sex, or national origin).
But see Ferand N. Dutile, God and Gays at Georgetown: Observations on Gay Rights
Coalition of Georgetown University Law Center v. Georgetown University, 15 J.C. & U.L.
1, 9-10 (1988) (finding court's assertion that all protected classes are of equal interest to
Council "difficult to believe," considering that prevention of racial discrimination figures
prominently in landmark constitutional cases and is discussed "in the very text of the
Constitution"). Such a move is advanced by many people who advocate increased protection
for homosexuals.
213. See Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274, 282 (Alaska)
(defining transactional interest as "preventing individual acts of discrimination based on
irrelevant characteristics"), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 460 (1994).
214. Gay Rights Coalition, 536 A.2d at 32.
215. Cf. id. at 38 (finding state's interest compelling).
216. Id. at 35-36.
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to those classes provided heightened constitutional scrutiny under the Equal
Protection Clause.2 17 According to the court, sexual orientation exhibits the
2'18
same characteristics as those classes receiving strict or heightened scrutiny.
The Gay Rights Coalition court determined that there was in fact a compelling
state interest in the eradication of sexual orientation discrimination and
proceeded to weigh this interest against the burden imposed by the enforcement of the Human Rights Act against Georgetown University.2 9 The court,
after considering the slight burden on Georgetown's religious exercise and

the compelling nature of the state interest, found that the burden on religious
freedom did not outweigh the government's interest in ending discrimination
based on sexual orientation. 22
However, were a court to limit the state interest to eliminating discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, in a manner similar to the narrow
interest defined in Smith, Donahue, and Desilets, it is likely that the court
would find no compelling interest.m The Gay Rights Coalitioncourt's view
of an equivalent state interest in ending discrimination against all protected
classes runs contrary to the majority of cases examining the nature of the state
interest in eradicating marital status discrimination.2"
The court's finding

217. Id. at 36-37.
218. Id. The Gay Rights Coalition court found that causes outside the control of the
individual determined sexual orientation, which was not subject to change. Id. at 36. Society
judges homosexuals not on their abilities, but on injurious stereotypes. Id. There is a long
history of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. Id. Finally, the political processes
ordinarily utilized to protect the interests of minorities have neglected homosexuals. Id. at 37.
219. Id. at 38.
220. See supra note 203 (discussing court's distinction between endorsing gay student
group and providing group with tangible benefits and court's determination that Human Rights
Act required only latter).
221. Gay Rights Coalition v. Georgetown Univ., 536 A.2d 1, 38-39 (D.C. 1987). The
final step in the free exercise analysis requires a determination of whether enforcement of the
statute is the least restrictive means of advancing the government's goal. Id. at 39. The court
found that the Human Rights Act could not be so narrowly tailored as to allow Georgetown to
withhold tangible benefits without defeating the purpose of the statute. Id. Thus, the court did
not grant Georgetown an exemption from the Human Rights Act. Id.
222. See Smith v. Commission of Fair Employment & Hous., 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 395, 406
(Ct. App.) (finding no interest in eliminating marital status discrimination sufficient to outweigh
religious exercise rights of landlord), review granted, 880 P.2d 111 (Cal. 1994); Donahue v.
Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n., 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 32, 46 (Ct. App. 1991) (same), review
granted, 825 P.2d 766 (Cal. 1992), review dismissed and cause remanded, 859 P.2d 671 (Cal.
1993); Attorney Gen. v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233, 238 (Mass. 1994) (limiting state interest to
prohibition of marital status discrimination).
223. See Smith, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 404 (limiting state interest to elimination of discrimination against unmarried couples); Donahue, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 44 (same).
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that all forms of discrimination based on anything other than merit appears to
be a step toward equating sexual orientation with those classifications considered immutable, such as race and gender. 4 Regardless, homosexuality, as
opposed to race or gender, remains a morally controversial issue, which some
see as indicative of an individual's character.'
The nature of the state
interest in prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination is not nearly as well-

defined as that of eradicating some other forms of discrimination, such as
racial or gender-based discrimination.'
Comparing homosexual couples to unmarried couples, whose protection

the courts have not generally considered compelling,'

a court is unlikely to

find that the eradication of sexual orientation discrimination is a compelling
state interest.m The state denies homosexual couples many of the same
224. Gay Rights Coalition, 536 A.2d at 33. Such an attempt would move sexual orientation closer to race and gender as an immutable characteristic. But see Duncan, supra note
18, at 398-99 (recognizing conflicting results that arise when homosexuals are defined by
conduct or by identity). Professor Duncan, while leery of claims that sexual orientation is
immutable and unchangeable, argues that the immutability of race is not the reason that
discrimination against racial minorities is so offensive. Id. at 402. Instead, he argues that
racial discrimination is wrong not because race is immutable, but because "it is a morally
neutral characteristic" that "tells us nothing about a person's character." Id. at 403. Sexual
orientation and behavior, however, "tell us much about a person's character because they tell
us what a person does." Id. However, debate continues concerning the origins of
homosexuality within an individual. The Gay Rights Coalitioncourt admitted that there was
no scientific agreement on the role of choice in determining sexual orientation. See Gay
Rights Coalition, 536 A.2d at 34 (recognizing that there is "no scientific agreement as to the
origins of heterosexual, bisexual or homosexual orientation."). See generally WARREN J.
BLUMENFELD & DIANE RAYMOND, LOOKING AT GAY AND LESBIAN LIFE (1988). Alternatively, the Gay Rights Coalitioncourt, if it is not expressing its belief that sexual orientation
is not a matter of choice, may be indicating that the choice to become homosexual is not one
that is morally questionable and thus is not reflective of individual merit.
225. See Duncan, supra note 18, at 405 n.41 (recognizing controversial nature of
homosexuality, supported by recent Gallup Poll that found that 57% of Americans deemed
homosexuality unacceptable lifestyle (citing ARIZ. REPUBLIC, Apr. 25, 1993, at A19)).
226. See supra notes 175-81 and accompanying text (discussing compelling state interest
in eradicating racial discrimination); see also Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609,
626 (1984) (recognizing compelling state interest in eradicating discrimination based on
gender); Dutile, supra note 212, at 10 (noting that Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186
(1986), reflects attitude of Court "quite unlike the receptivity it has manifested toward claims
brought by racial minorities").
227. See supra notes 133-50 and accompanying text (discussing determination that
protection of unmarried couples was not compelling state interest). But see supra notes 15158 and accompanying text (discussing existence of compelling state interest in eradicating discrimination against unmarried couples).
228. But cf. Gay Rights Coalition v. Georgetown Univ., 536 A.2d 1, 33 (D.C. 1987)
(finding compelling state interest in ending discrimination based on sexual orientation). Gay
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benefits denied unmarried couples. 9 As with unmarried couples,' courts
specifically addressing the scrutiny due discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation in equal protection challenges have not found that gays and

lesbians constitute a suspect or quasi-suspect class.'
A final factor not considered by the lead opinion of Gay Rights Coalition, but one that a court should address in examining whether the state's

interest is compelling, is the existence of statutes criminalizing sodomy.

'

Rights Coalition could be distinguished on several points. The compelling state interest determination was not specifically focused on housing, but instead on education. Georgetown's
interest is institutional in nature, providing a secular education "informed by Christian
values," while a landlord's interest is a directly personal one. See Dutile, supra note 212,
at 11 (recognizing that Georgetown's interest was institutional). Even if Gay Rights Coalition
and our hypothetical situation cannot be distinguished, a landlord certainly could challenge
the court's finding of a compelling state interest. For example, the court found that
homosexuality was not an indicator of individual merit. Gay Rights Coalition, 536 A.2d at
36. However, this argument is by no means settled, both within the legal community as well
as society at large. See supra note 224 (discussing controversy). The court's attempts to
equate homosexuals with other classes that are provided heightened scrutiny have failed when
actually applied in the equal protection context. See infra note 231 (discussing cases denying
suspect or quasi-suspect classifications to homosexuals).
229. See supra notes 135-37, 142 and accompanying text (discussing benefits given
married couples over unmarried couples). With respect to one right in particular, the right
to marry, homosexuals are entitled to less protection than unmarried couples. See supra note
188 and accompanying text (discussing prohibition on same-sex marriages).
230. See Smith v. Shalala, 5 F.3d 235, 239 (7th Cir. 1993) (recognizing that classification based on marital status does not involve suspect class), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1309
(1994).
231. See, e.g., High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563,
573-74 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding that homosexuality is different from race and gender in equal
protection context because homosexuality is primarily behavioral in nature, and conduct or
behavior of class has no bearing on its suspect or quasi-suspect designation); Woodward v.
United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1076 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (finding that gay men, lesbians, and
bisexuals do not constitute suspect class), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1003 (1990); Padula v.
Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 102 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (finding that homosexuals are not members of
suspect or quasi-suspect class); Evans v. Romer, 854 P.2d 1270, 1275 (Colo.) (finding that gay
men, lesbians, and bisexuals were not suspect class for purposes of equal protection analysis),
cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 419 (1993). See generally Note, The ConstitutionalStatus of Sexual
Orientation: Homosexuality as a Suspect Classification, 98 HARv. L. REv. 1285 (1985).
"[Albsent heightened scrutiny of sexual orientation discrimination, the state interest in
eradicating prejudice will not be a sufficiently compelling justification for restricting the right
to free exercise of one's religion." Developments, supra note 182, at 1670 (anticipating
possibility that Gay Rights Coalition might perpetuate belief that gay students are unacceptable
and stating that "[blecause the Supreme Court has declined to define homosexuality as a suspect
classification, such discrimination may continue under current law").
232. The dissent of Judge Nebeker in Gay Rights Coalition, however, did question the use
of state power to require a religious body to provide facilities and services to "those who
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If homosexual orientation is distinct from homosexual conduct, these statutes

are of little importY 3 Most courts do not, however, find such a distinction.'

4

Thus, sodomy statutes strengthen the argument against finding a

compelling interest in eliminating sexual orientation discrimination"5 While
admittedly unsettled, courts are likely to provide a landlord who discriminates against homosexuals on the basis of a sincerely held religious belief a
free exercise exemption from an antidiscrimination statute.
VI. Conclusion

In a discussion of this nature, one must recognize the difficulty in
attempting to reconcile two important, but ultimately conflicting, interests.
In weighing the two interests, courts should accommodate the constitutionally guaranteed religious exercise of landlords. The majority of cases have

not found the eradication of marital status discrimination sufficiently compelling to overcome the burden placed on a landlord's free exercise rights. In
like manner, a court addressing landlord bias against homosexual couples
should allow a free exercise exemption based on the lack of a compelling
state interest in protecting same-sex couples sufficient to outweigh religious

exercise rights. This protection, whether under federal or state constitutional
advocate and proselytize abnormal and criminal sexual practices." See Gay Rights Coalition,
536 A.2d at 75 (Nebeker, J., dissenting); see also ALA. CODE §§ 13A-6-63 to -64 (1994)
(criminalizing sodomy); ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-1411 (1989) (same); ARKc. CODEANN.
§ 5-14-122 (Michie 1987) (same); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (1992 & Supp. 1995) (same);
IDAHO CODE § 18-6605 (1987) (same); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3505 (1995) (same); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 14:89 (West 1986) (same); MD. CODE ANN. art. 27, §§ 553-54 (1987 & Supp.
1991); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609 (West 1987) (same); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-29-59 (1994);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 566.060 (Vernon 1979 & Supp. 1996) (same); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 45-2101, 45-5-505 (1995) (same); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-177 (1993) (same); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
21, § 886 (1983 & Supp. 1996) (same); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-10-1 (1994) (same); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 16-15-120 (Law. Co-op. 1985) (same); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-510 (1991) (same);
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 21.01(1), 21.06 (West 1994 & Supp. 1995) (same); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 76-5-403 (1995); VA. CODE ANN. § 18-2.361 (Michie 1988) (same).
233. See supra note 189 (discussing courts' general refusal to distinguish between
conduct and orientation).
234. See Equality Found. v. City of Cincinnati, 54 F.3d 261, 267 (6th Cir. 1995)
(examining constitutionality of amendment to city charter prohibiting city from providing
preferential treatment based on homosexual orientation), petitionfor cert.filed, 64 U.S.L.W.
(U.S. Aug. 10, 1995) (No. 95-239). In Equality Foundation, the court recognized the
difficulty in distinguishing individuals of a particular orientation which predisposes them to
certain sexual conduct from those who actually engage in that conduct. Id.; see also supra
note 189 (discussing courts' general refusal to distinguish between conduct and orientation).
235. See generally Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1989) (discussing
findings that equate conduct with orientation), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1004 (1990).
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provisions," 6 should allow exemptions for landlords refusing to rent on the
basis of both marital status and sexual orientation. 7 While society increasingly has accepted heterosexual and homosexual cohabitation, there are some
whose religious beliefs dictate otherwise. Whether society views this as
right or wrong, landlords are constitutionally entitled to hold those beliefs
and to act upon them accordingly without persecution from the state.

236. See supra notes 8-28 and accompanying text (discussing religious protection under
federal constitution and increased use of state constitutions to provide more extensive
protection).
237. In addition, legislatures should expand the application of statutory exemptions from
discrimination statutes. See Duncan, supra note 18, at 438 (recognizing that discrimination
statutes are not least restrictive means for carrying out state's interest and arguing for free
exercise exemption, which would not "destroy the state's asserted interest in providing
housing . . . opportunities to homosexuals"); Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free
Exercise, 1990 Sup. CT. REv. 1, 50 (stating that any exemption "is substantial evidence that
religious exemptions would not threaten the statutory scheme"). While the recently passed
RFRA creates a statutory exemption for religiously motivated conduct, it goes no further than
the compelling state interest test applied before Employment Div. v. Smith or the tests applied
by state courts to landlord-tenant conflicts. Thus, specific exemptions from antidiscrimination
statutes would provide a more secure standing for landlords and would reduce the need to rely
on the courts for relief.
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